Sensazioni o proprietà sensibili? Lo statuto ontologico dei qualia in fenomenologia

In Roberta Lanfredini (ed.), Architettura della conoscenza e ontologia. Mimesis. pp. 157-187 (2015)
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Abstract
In this paper, I address the issue of the ontological status of qualitative properties. I discuss the prevalent approaches to the problem of qualia in philosophy of mind, in relation to the various attempts at naturalizing the mind and the various theories of perception. I compare these views with Husserl's phenomenology, highlighting the phenomenological distinction between phenomenal contents of mental states and sensory properties of the perceived objects. I present some open issues of this view, in order to show how they can be addressed in the light of some developments of the phenomenological inquiry in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.
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Archival date: 2015-09-11
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