Going on as one ought: Kripke and Wittgenstein on the normativity of meaning

Mind and Language (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Kripke’s thesis that meaning is normative is typically interpreted, following Boghossian, as the thesis that meaningful expressions allow of true or warranted use. I argue for an alternative interpretation centered on Wittgenstein’s conception of the normativity involved in “knowing how to go on” in one’s use of an expression. Meaning is normative for Kripke because it justifies claims, not to be saying something true, but to be going on as one ought from prevous uses of the expression. I argue that this represents a distortion of Wittgenstein’s conception of the normativity of meaning, and that Wittgenstein’s conception is preferable
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GINGOA
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-10-04
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-03-09

Total views
84 ( #54,574 of 69,985 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #21,877 of 69,985 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.