Authoritative Knowledge

Erkenntnis 87 (5):2475-2502 (2020)
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Abstract

This paper investigates ‘authoritative knowledge’, a neglected species of practical knowledge gained on the basis of exercising practical authority. I argue that, like perceptual knowledge, authoritative knowledge is non-inferential. I then present a broadly reliabilist account of the process by which authority yields knowledge, and use this account to address certain objections.

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Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock
Georgia State University

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