A non-utilitarian consequentialist value framework (Pettit's and Sen's theories of values)

Filozofia 54 (7):483-494 (1999)
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Abstract
Consequentialism is seen by Philip Pettit mainly as a theory of the appropriate; in his conception of virtual consequentialism he is much less concerned with the theory of Good. Nevertheless, he pays attention to values such as rights, freedom, loyalty, confidence, dignity and love, although his analyses are isolated, and the connections with other values are not taken into account. He focuses especially on the values of freedom and rights. Contrary to Pettit, Amaryta Sen is much more concerned with the latter, although there is no complex value framework to be find in his evaluator relative theory. He sees these values as the basis of the value system of any morais.
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Rights and Agency.Sen, Amartya
The Cunning of Trust.Pettit, Philip
Virtue Ethics.Slote, Michael
Freedom as Antipower.Pettit, Philip

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