Malicious pleasure evaluated: Is pleasure an unconditional good?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):24–31 (2003)
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Pleasure is one of the strongest candidates for an occurrence that might be good, in some respect, unconditionally. Malicious pleasure is one of the most often cited alleged counter-examples to pleasure’s being an unconditional good. Correctly evaluating malicious pleasure is more complex than people realize. I defend pleasure’s unconditionally good status from critics of malicious pleasure.
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