Contents
16 found
Order:
  1. Making interpersonal comparisons of the value of income with a hypothetical auction.Stephen J. Schmidt - manuscript
    Economic policy decisions require comparisons of the gains and losses from policy choices to different people. If those gains can be valued in monetary terms, than all that is needed is a comparison of the value of income to different persons, which can be weights in cost-benefit analysis. An objective comparison of the value of income to different people has been long sought but never found. I propose that when money to be allocated is controlled by a group of people (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Share the Sugar.Christian Tarsney, Harvey Lederman & Dean Spears - manuscript
    We provide a general argument against value incomparability, based on a new style of impossibility result. In particular, we show that, against plausible background assumptions, value incomparability creates an incompatibility between two very plausible principles for ranking lotteries: a weak "negative dominance" principle (to the effect that Lottery 1 can be better than Lottery 2 only if some possible outcome of Lottery 1 is better than some possible outcome of Lottery 2) and a weak form of ex ante Pareto (to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Children’s Rights, Well-Being, and Sexual Agency.Samantha Brennan & Jennifer Epp - forthcoming - In Alexander Bagattini and Colin MacLeod (ed.), The Wellbeing of Children in Theory and Practice.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. In Defense of Fanaticism.Hayden Wilkinson - 2022 - Ethics 132 (2):445-477.
    Which is better: a guarantee of a modest amount of moral value, or a tiny probability of arbitrarily large value? To prefer the latter seems fanatical. But, as I argue, avoiding such fanaticism brings severe problems. To do so, we must decline intuitively attractive trade-offs; rank structurally identical pairs of lotteries inconsistently, or else admit absurd sensitivity to tiny probability differences; have rankings depend on remote, unaffected events ; and often neglect to rank lotteries as we already know we would (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  5. Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm.Tanya de Villiers-Botha - 2020 - SATS 21 (1):21-38.
    In recent attempts to define ‘harm’, the most promising approach has often been thought to be the counterfactual comparative account of harm. Nevertheless, this account faces serious difficulties. Moreover, it has been argued that ‘harm’ cannot be defined without reference to a substantive theory of well-being, which is itself a fraught issue. This has led to the call for the concept to simply be dropped from the moral lexicon altogether. I reject this call, arguing that the non-comparative approach to defining (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Human Rights of Users of Humanlike Care Automata.Lantz Fleming Miller - 2020 - Human Rights Review 21 (2):181-205.
    Care is more than dispensing pills or cleaning beds. It is about responding to the entire patient. What is called “bedside manner” in medical personnel is a quality of treating the patient not as a mechanism but as a being—much like the caregiver—with desires, ideas, dreams, aspirations, and the gamut of mental and emotional character. As automata, answering an increasing functional need in care, are designed to enact care, the pressure is on their becoming more humanlike to carry out the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. The Dignity of Human Life: Sketching Out an 'Equal Worth' Approach.Helen Watt - 2020 - Ethics and Medicine 36 (1):7-17.
    The term “value of life” can refer to life’s intrinsic dignity: something nonincremental and time-unaffected in contrast to the fluctuating, incremental “value” of our lives, as they are longer or shorter and more or less flourishing. Human beings are equal in their basic moral importance: the moral indignities we condemn in the treatment of e.g. those with dementia reflect the ongoing human dignity that is being violated. Indignities licensed by the person in advance remain indignities, as when people might volunteer (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Oraciones normativas y sensibilidad a la evaluación.Justina Diaz Legaspe - 2017 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 43 (1):29-47.
    Nuestro lenguaje no solo describe el mundo que nos rodea: muchas expresiones que usamos habitualmente (desde predicados de gusto a expresiones como “interesante” o “divertido”) tienen por función valorar los objetos que constituyen nuestro entorno. Las oraciones que las contienen son sensibles a la evaluación: su valor de verdad depende del estándar evaluativo saliente en contexto y su emisión puede dar lugar a desacuerdos duros. El presente trabajo examina la ex- tensión de esta categoría a oraciones con predicados y verbos (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Harming Yourself and Others: A Note on the Asymmetry of Agency in Action Evaluations.Erich Rast - 2016 - Polish Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (2014) (2):65-74.
    Principles are investigated that allow one to establish a preference ordering between possible actions based on the question of whether the acting agent himself or other agents will benefit or be harmed by the consequences of an action. It is shown that a combination of utility maximization, an altruist principle, and weak negative utilitarianism yields an ordering that seems to be intuitively appealing, although it does not necessarily reflect common everyday evaluations of actions.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Review of Christine Overall`s Why Have Children? The Ethical Debate'. [REVIEW]Shelley Tremain - 2013 - Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 12 (2):20-22.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. The Unusual Logic of Hurka's Recursive Account.Avram Hiller - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (1):1-6.
    Thomas Hurka, in his book Virtue, Vice, and Value, and elsewhere, develops a recursive analysis of higher-order pleasures and pains. The account leads Hurka to some potentially controversial conclusions. For instance, Hurka argues on its basis that some states are both good and evil and also that the view he calls the conditionality view is false. In this paper, I argue that Hurka’s formulation of the recursive account is unusual and inelegant, and that Hurka reaches his conclusions only because of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Malicious pleasure evaluated: Is pleasure an unconditional good?Irwin Goldstein - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):24–31.
    Pleasure is one of the strongest candidates for an occurrence that might be good, in some respect, unconditionally. Malicious pleasure is one of the most often cited alleged counter-examples to pleasure’s being an unconditional good. Correctly evaluating malicious pleasure is more complex than people realize. I defend pleasure’s unconditionally good status from critics of malicious pleasure.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13. Why Should I Care About Morality?Arnold Zuboff - 2001 - Philosophy Now 31:24-27.
    For a while in this article it seems impossible to articulate a compelling reason for refraining from killing an innocent stranger with the press of a button when this would earn one a small prize and would be done with absolutely guaranteed immunity from any punishment or other harm (including even an instantaneous elimination of any chance of a guilty memory, achieved through hypnosis, and an ironclad commitment from God not to condemn the killing). After many failed attempts, a compelling (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Morality as What One Really Desires.Arnold Zuboff - 1995 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):142-164.
    If I desire to drink some stuff thinking it is hot chocolate when actually it is hot mud, my desire is not a real one - it’s mistaken or only apparent. This example illustrates how a desire must always depend on a belief about its object, a belief about what it is and what it’s like. But beliefs are correctable, so desires are correctable. This leads us directly to a very sweeping principle - that I only really desire what I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. Pleasure and pain: Unconditional intrinsic values.Irwin Goldstein - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.
    That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa Foot, R M (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  16. The Rationality of Pleasure-Seeking Animals.Irwin Goldstein - 1988 - In Sander Lee (ed.), Inquiries Into Value. Edwin Mellen Press.
    Reason guides pleasure-seeking animals in leading them to prefer pleasure to pain.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark