Why the Transcendental Deduction is Compatible with Nonconceptualism

In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 27-52 (2016)
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Abstract
One of the strongest motivations for conceptualist readings of Kant is the belief that the Transcendental Deduction is incompatible with nonconceptualism. In this article, I argue that this belief is simply false: the Deduction and nonconceptualism are compatible at both an exegetical and a philosophical level. Placing particular emphasis on the case of non-human animals, I discuss in detail how and why my reading diverges from those of Ginsborg, Allais, Gomes and others. I suggest ultimately that it is only by embracing nonconceptualism that we can fully recognise the delicate calibration of the trap which the Critique sets for Hume.
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