Results for 'Transcendental Deduction'

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  1. Transcendental Deduction Against Hume's Challenge to Reason.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2020 - Kant-e-Print 15 (2):6-31.
    From the second half of the last century, there has been a widespread view in the Anglophone world that Kant’s transcendental deduction (aka TD) aims to vindicate our common-sense view of the world as composed of public and objective particulars against some unqualified forms of skepticism. This widespread assumption has raised serious doubt not only about the success of TD but also about the very nature of its argument in both editions of the Critique. Yet, if there is (...)
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  2. Why the Transcendental Deduction is Compatible with Nonconceptualism.Sacha Golob - 2016 - In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London, England: Palgrave. pp. 27-52.
    One of the strongest motivations for conceptualist readings of Kant is the belief that the Transcendental Deduction is incompatible with nonconceptualism. In this article, I argue that this belief is simply false: the Deduction and nonconceptualism are compatible at both an exegetical and a philosophical level. Placing particular emphasis on the case of non-human animals, I discuss in detail how and why my reading diverges from those of Ginsborg, Allais, Gomes and others. I suggest ultimately that it (...)
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  3. Is Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories fit for purpose?Anil Gomes - 2010 - Kantian Review 15 (2):118-137.
    James Van Cleve has argued that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories shows, at most, that we must apply the categories to experience. And this falls short of Kant’s aim, which is to show that they must so apply. In this discussion I argue that once we have noted the differences between the first and second editions of the Deduction, this objection is less telling. But Van Cleve’s objection can help illuminate the structure of the B (...), and it suggests an interesting reason why the rewriting might have been thought necessary. (shrink)
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  4. Kant’s Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions of the Categories. Tasks, Steps, and Claims of Identity.Till Hoeppner - 2022 - In Giuseppe Motta, Dennis Schulting & Udo Thiel (eds.), Kant's Transcendental Deduction and the Theory of Apperception: New Interpretations. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 461-492.
    Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories justifies their apriority, i.e. that their contents originate in the understanding itself, while the Transcendental Deduction justifies their objectivity, both in that they purport to represent objects of experience and that they do so successfully. The apriority of the categories, as explained in terms of acts of synthesis required for having sensible intuitions of objects, is justified by establishing their generic identity with logical functions of judgment, i.e. acts of judgment required (...)
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  5. Kant on the Transcendental Deduction of Space and Time: an essay on the philosophical resources of the Transcendental Aesthetic.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2010 - Kantian Review 14 (2):1-37.
    I take up Kant's remarks about a " transcendental deduction" of the "concepts of space and time". I argue for the need to make a clearer assessment of the philosophical resources of the Aesthetic in order to account for this transcendental deduction. Special attention needs to be given to the fact that the central task of the Aesthetic is simply the "exposition" of these concepts. The Metaphysical Exposition reflects upon facts about our usage to reveal our (...)
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  6. Transcendental Idealism and the Transcendental Deduction.Lucy Allais - 2010 - In Dennis Schulting & Jacco Verburgt (eds.), Kant's Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine. Springer. pp. 91-107.
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  7. The shortest way: Kant’s rewriting of the transcendental deduction.Nathan Bauer - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):517-545.
    This work examines Kant’s remarkable decision to rewrite the core argument of the first Critique, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. I identify a two-part structure common to both versions: first establishing an essential role for the categories in unifying sensible intuitions; and then addressing a worry about how the connection between our faculties asserted in the first part is possible. I employ this structure to show how Kant rewrote the argument, focusing on Kant’s response to the concerns (...)
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  8. Overcoming Epistemic Compositionalism by Appreciating Kant's Insight: Skepticism, Givenness, and Mind-Independence in the Transcendental Deduction.Maximilian Tegtmeyer - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-37.
    Many interpretations of Kant’s first Critique fail to appreciate the revolutionary nature of his account of knowledge and its implications for skepticism, givenness and mind-independence, because they read Kant as holding a compositional account of knowledge. I contend that the reason for this is that this account is both naturally appealing in its own right, and fits an influential reading of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. On this reading, the Deduction aims to respond to a skeptical worry which issues (...)
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  9. Sensibility, Understanding, and Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: From Epistemic Compositionalism to Epistemic Hylomorphism.Maximilian Tegtmeyer - 2023 - Review of Metaphysics 77 (1):57-85.
    Can sensibility, as our capacity to be sensibly presented with objects, be understood independently of the understanding, as the capacity to form judgments about those objects? It is a truism that for judgments to be empirical knowledge they must agree with what sensibility presents. Moreover, it is a familiar thought that objectivity involves absolute independence from intellectual acts. The author argues that together these thoughts motivate a common reading of Kant on which operations of sensibility are conceived as intelligible independently (...)
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  10. Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Kant's Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. London, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 195-255.
    In this paper, I discuss the debate on Kant and nonconceptual content. Inspired by Kant’s account of the intimate relation between intuition and concepts, McDowell (1996) has forcefully argued that the relation between sensible content and concepts is such that sensible content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in conjunction with concepts. This view is known as conceptualism. Recently, Kantians Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, among others, have brought against this view the charge that it neglects the (...)
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  11. Henrich on Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2008 - In Valerio Hrsg v. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. de Gruyter. pp. 221-232.
    Dieter Henrich’s reconstruction of the transcendental deduction in "Identität und Objektivität" has been criticised (probably unfairly) by Guyer and others for assuming that we have a priori Cartesian certainty about our own continuing existence through time. In his later article "The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental Deduction", Henrich addresses this criticism and proposes a new, again entirely original argument for a reconstruction. I attempt to elucidate this argument with reference to Evans’s theory of the (...)
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  12. Mind Critical Notice of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, by Henry Allison.Golob Sacha - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):278-289.
    Critical Notice of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, by Henry Allison. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. Xv + 477.
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  13. The Central Role of Cognition in Kant's Transcendental Deduction.Curtis Sommerlatte - 2016 - Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington
    I argue that Kant’s primary epistemological concern in the Critique of Pure Reason’s transcendental deduction is empirical cognition. I show how empirical cognition is best understood as “rational sensory discrimination”: the capacity to discriminate sensory objects through the use of concepts and with a sensitivity to the normativity of reasons. My dissertation focuses on Kant’s starting assumption of the transcendental deduction, which I argue to be the thesis that we have empirical cognition. I then show how (...)
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  14. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories: Critical Re-Examination, Elucidation and Corroboration, by Kenneth R. Westphal. [REVIEW]Andrew Stephenson - 2022 - Hegel Bulletin 43 (3):491-496.
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  15. Transcendental Arguments for Personal Identity in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction.Jacqueline Mariña - 2011 - Philo 14 (2):109-136.
    One of the principle aims of the B version of Kant’s transcendental deduction is to show how it is possible that the same “I think” can accompany all of my representations, which is a transcendental condition of the possibility of judgment. Contra interpreters such as A. Brook, I show that this “I think” is an a priori (reflected) self-consciousness; contra P. Keller, I show that this a priori self-consciousness is first and foremost a consciousness of one’s personal (...)
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  16. Signaling systems and the transcendental deduction.A. Ahmed - 2017 - In K. Pearce & T. Goldschmidt (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    The paper offers a model of Kant's claim that unity of consciousness entails objectivity of experience. This claim has nothing especially to do with thought, language or the categories but is a general truth about arbitrary signaling systems of the sort modeled in the paper. In conclusion I draw some consequences for various forms of idealism.
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  17. Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical‐Historical Commentary, by Henry Allison. Oxford University Press, 2015, 496 pp. ISBN 13: 978‐0‐19‐872485‐8 hb £75.00. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):546-554.
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  18. The Concept of Experience and Strawson's Transcendental Deduction.Kim Davies - 1982 - Analysis 42 (1):16-19.
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  19. Kant on Perception: Naive Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction.Anil Gomes - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):1-19.
    According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
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  20. Kant's Subjective Deduction.Nathan Bauer - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s (...)
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  21. Minding the Gap: Subjectivism and the Deduction.Anil Gomes - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (1):99-109.
    Chapter 4 of Dennis Schulting’s book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism targets those commentators who take there to be a gap in the transcendental deduction of the categories, arguing instead that there is no gap between the necessary application of the categories and their exemplification in the object of experience. In these comments on the chapter, I suggest a minimal sense in which the fact that there is a gap is non-negotiable. The interesting question is not whether there is a (...)
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  22. Genealogy and Jurisprudence in Fichte’s Genetic Deduction of the Categories.G. Anthony Bruno - 2018 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (1):77-96.
    Fichte argues that the conclusion of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories is correct yet lacks a crucial premise, given Kant’s admission that the metaphysical deduction locates an arbitrary origin for the categories. Fichte provides the missing premise by employing a new method: a genetic deduction of the categories from a first principle. Since Fichte claims to articulate the same view as Kant in a different, it is crucial to grasp genetic deduction in relation to (...)
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  23. Skepticism, Deduction, and Reason’s Maturation.G. Anthony Bruno - 2018 - In G. Anthony Bruno & A. C. Rutherford (eds.), Skepticism: Historical and Contemporary Inquiries. New York: Routledge. pp. 203-19.
    A puzzle arises when we consider that, for Kant, the categories are 'original acquisitions' of our understanding to which we must nevertheless prove our entitlement via 'deduction', on pain of dogmatism. I resolve this puzzle by articulating skepticism’s role in the transcendental deduction, drawing on Kant’s construal of the skeptical 'question quid juris' in the juridical terms of entitlement to property. I then situate skepticism’s transformative potential within what Kant regards as reason’s 'maturation' from dogmatism toward self-knowledge. (...)
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  24. The Subjective Deduction and Kant’s Methodological Skepticism.Huaping Lu-Adler - 2022 - In Giuseppe Motta, Dennis Schulting & Udo Thiel (eds.), Kant's Transcendental Deduction and the Theory of Apperception: New Interpretations. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 341-60.
    The deduction of categories in the 1781 edition of the Critique of the Pure Reason (A Deduction) has “two sides”—the “objective deduction” and the “subjective deduction”. Kant seems ambivalent about the latter deduction. I treat it as a significant episode of Kant’s thinking about categories that extended from the early 1770s to around 1790. It contains his most detailed answer to the question about the origin of categories that he formulated in the 1772 letter to (...)
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  25. Transcendental Idealism F.S.Frances Rosemary Shaw - manuscript
    In this paper I present an interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories (a dangerous interpretation it turns out), based primarily on the “two-step” argument of the B deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason. I undertake to show that Kant’s distinction between the “pure forms of intuition” and “pure formal intuition” is successful in its attempt to prove that all sensible intuitions presuppose the a priori categories, in a way which is compatible, I claim, (...)
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  26. Kant’s Transcendental Turn to the Object.Karin De Boer - 2024 - Studi Kantiani 36:11-353.
    In the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere, Kant uses the term ‘object’ in various ways and often without clearly signaling its different meanings. As a result, it is hard to gauge the extent to which Kant’s account of the object of cognition breaks new ground. In this article, I take the Critique to establish what is required to generate an object of cognition per se soleley by examining the various ways in which the human mind can objectify the content (...)
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  27. Two deductions: (1) from the totality to quantum information conservation; (2) from the latter to dark matter and dark energy.Vasil Penchev - 2020 - Information Theory and Research eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 1 (28):1-47.
    The paper discusses the origin of dark matter and dark energy from the concepts of time and the totality in the final analysis. Though both seem to be rather philosophical, nonetheless they are postulated axiomatically and interpreted physically, and the corresponding philosophical transcendentalism serves heuristically. The exposition of the article means to outline the “forest for the trees”, however, in an absolutely rigorous mathematical way, which to be explicated in detail in a future paper. The “two deductions” are two successive (...)
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  28. The Proof-Structure of Kant’s A-Edition Objective Deduction.Corey W. Dyck - 2022 - In Giuseppe Motta, Dennis Schulting & Udo Thiel (eds.), Kant's Transcendental Deduction and the Theory of Apperception: New Interpretations. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 381-402.
    Kant's A-Edition objective deduction is naturally (and has traditionally been) divided into two arguments: an " argument from above" and one that proceeds " von unten auf." This would suggest a picture of Kant's procedure in the objective deduction as first descending and ascending the same ladder, the better, perhaps, to test its durability or to thoroughly convince the reader of its soundness. There are obvious obstacles to such a reading, however; and in this chapter I will argue (...)
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  29. Transcendental Paralogisms as Formal Fallacies - Kant’s Refutation of Pure Rational Psychology.Toni Kannisto - 2018 - Kant Studien 109 (2):195-227.
    : According to Kant, the arguments of rational psychology are formal fallacies that he calls transcendental paralogisms. It remains heavily debated whether there actually is any formal error in the inferences Kant presents: according to Grier and Allison, they are deductively invalid syllogisms, whereas Bennett, Ameriks, and Van Cleve deny that they are formal fallacies. I advance an interpretation that reconciles these extremes: transcendental paralogisms are sound in general logic but constitute formal fallacies in transcendental logic. By (...)
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  30. The Proof Structure of Kant's A-Edition Objective Deduction.Corey W. Dyck - 2019 - In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kant’s Deduction From Apperception: An Essay on the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.
    Kant's A-Edition objective deduction is naturally (and has traditionally been) divided into two arguments: an " argument from above" and one that proceeds " von unten auf." This would suggest a picture of Kant's procedure in the objective deduction as first descending and ascending the same ladder, the better, perhaps, to test its durability or to thoroughly convince the reader of its soundness. There are obvious obstacles to such a reading, however; and in this chapter I will argue (...)
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  31. Nonconceptualism, Hume’s Problem, and the Deduction.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1687-1698.
    Lucy Allais seeks to provide a reading of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories which is compatible with a nonconceptualist account of Kant’s theory of intuition. According to her interpretation, the aim of the Deduction is to show that a priori concept application is required for empirical concept application. I argue that once we distinguish the application of the categories from the instantiation of the categories, we see that Allais’s reconstruction of the Deduction cannot provide an (...)
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  32. Apperception and Object. Comments on Mario Caimi's Reading of the B-Deduction.Dennis Schulting - 2022 - Revista de Estudios Kantianos 7 (2):462-481.
    I critically examine one central line of reasoning in Mario Caimi's book »Kant's B Deduction« (Cambridge Publishing, 2014).
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  33. Kant's Legal Metaphor and the Nature of a Deduction.Ian Proops - 2003 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2):209-229.
    This essay partly builds on and partly criticizes a striking idea of Dieter Henrich. Henrich argues that Kant's distinction in the first Critique between the question of fact (quid facti) and the question of law (quid juris) provides clues to the argumentative structure of a philosophical "Deduction". Henrich suggests that the unity of apperception plays a role analogous to a legal factum. By contrast, I argue, first, that the question of fact in the first Critique is settled by the (...)
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  34. Merleau‐Ponty’s Reading of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.Henry Somers-Hall - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):103-131.
    The aim of this paper is to explore Merleau-Ponty’s ambivalent relationship with Kant’s transcendental philosophy. I begin by looking at several points of convergence between Kant and Merleau-Ponty, focusing on the affinities between Kant’s account of transcendental realism and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of objective thought. I then show how Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of Kant’s paradox of asymmetrical objects points to a parallel in Kant’s thought to Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of perception. In the second part of the paper, I (...)
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  35. The Origin and Validity of Root Concepts, the Place of General Logic Within Transcendental Logic and Kant’s Critique of Dogmatism: A Response to My Critics.Gabriele Gava - 2023 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 4 (3):267-282.
    In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics (CUP 2023), I argue that the first Critique is not only a ‘propaedeutic’ to metaphysics, but actually already establishes parts of metaphysics. These parts belong to what Kant calls transcendental philosophy. Additionally, I also provide an account of Kant’s critique of dogmatism and Wolff as its main defender. In this paper, I take up Luigi Filieri’s and Davide Dalla Rosa’s invitation to further develop my characterization of transcendental (...)
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  36. Science and the Synthetic Method of the Critique of Pure Reason.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2006 - Review of Metaphysics 59 (3):517-539.
    Kant maintains that his Critique of Pure Reason follows a “synthetic method” which he distinguishes from the analytic method of the Prolegomena by saying that the Critique “rests on no other science” and “takes nothing as given except reason itself”. The paper presents an account of the synthetic method of the Critique, showing how it is related to Kant’s conception of the Critique as the “science of an a priori judging reason”. Moreover, the author suggests, understanding its synthetic method sheds (...)
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  37. Probleme des ‚kantianischen‘ Nonkonzeptualismus im Hinblick auf die B-Deduktion.Dennis Schulting - 2015 - Kant Studien 106 (4):561-580.
    :Recently, Allais, Hanna and others have argued that Kant is a nonconceptualist about intuition and that intuitions refer objectively, independently of the functions of the understanding. Kantian conceptualists have responded, which the nonconceptualists also cite as textual evidence for their reading) that this view conflicts with the central goal of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I argue that the conceptualist reading of KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. is unfounded. Further, (...)
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  38. The Analytic of Concepts.Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes - 2024 - In Mark Timmons & Sorin Baiasu (eds.), The Kantian Mind. London and New York: Routledge.
    The aim of the Analytic of Concepts is to derive and deduce a set of pure concepts of the understanding, the categories, which play a central role in Kant’s explanation of the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition and judgment. This chapter is structured around two questions. First, what is a pure concept of the understanding? Second, what is involved in a deduction of a pure concept of the understanding? In answering the first, we focus on how the categories (...)
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  39. Empirical consciousness explained: Self-affection, (self-)consciousness and perception in the B deduction.Corey W. Dyck - 2006 - Kantian Review 11:29-54.
    Few of Kant’s doctrines are as difficult to understand as that of self-affection. Its brief career in the published literature consists principally in its unheralded introduction in the Transcendental Aesthetic and unexpected re-appearance at a key moment in the Deduction chapter in the B edition of the first Critique. Kant’s commentators, confronted with the difficulty of this doctrine, have naturally resorted to various strategies of clarification, ranging from distinguishing between empirical and transcendental self-affection, divorcing self-affection from the (...)
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  40. Kant and the Pre-Conceptual Use of the Understanding.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2021 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (1):93-119.
    Does Kant hold that we can have intuitions independently of concepts? A striking passage from § 13 of the Critique of Pure Reason appears to say so explicitly. However, it also conjures up a scenario where the categories are inapplicable to objects of intuition, a scenario presumably shown impossible by the following Transcendental Deduction. The seemingly non-conceptualist claim concerning intuition have therefore been read, by conceptualist interpreters of Kant, as similarly counterpossible. I argue that the passage in question (...)
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  41. Between Sensibility and Understanding: Kant and Merleau-Ponty and the Critique of Reason.Donald A. Landes - 2015 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 29 (3):335-345.
    ABSTRACT Whether explicitly or implicitly, Kant's critical project weighs heavily upon Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. This article argues that we can understand Merleau-Ponty's text as a phenomenological rewriting of the Critique of Pure Reason from within the paradoxical structures of lived experience, effectively merging Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic. Although he was influenced by Husserl's and Heidegger's interpretations of Kant's first version of the Transcendental Deduction, Merleau-Ponty develops a unique position between Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger (...)
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  42. A NONCONCEPTUALIST READING OF THE B-DEDUCTION.de Sá Pereira Roberto horácio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174:425–442.
    In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks (Int J Philos Stud 19(3):399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” (Erkenntnis/cognition) has, in both editions of the first Critique, a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception” (A320/B377). To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. If we take this meaning as a premise of the (...)
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  43. The Role of Positivism in Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology.Yusuk Lee - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 19:61-68.
    Husserl’s phenomenology opens itself with a critique of positive sciences. Husserl problematizes the hardcore presupposition of positivism that the world is a definite sort of an existential totality of objects and thus it is exhaustible with empirical data and deductive-conceptual abstraction on the basis of causalspatio-temoprality. Criticizing the wholesome reduction of nature into a physical reality and the instrumentalizing of theoretical reason, he proposes transcendental phenomenology, as an ideal form of science. Self-entitled as the genuine science, the science of (...)
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  44. How Kant Thought He Could Reach Hume.Charles Goldhaber - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 717–726.
    I argue that Kant thought his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts could reach skeptical empiricists like Hume by providing an overlooked explanation of the mind's a priori relation to the objects of experience. And he thought empiricists may be motivated to listen to this explanation because of an instability and dissatisfaction inherent to empiricism. This article is a précis of my "Kant's Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist" in Journal of the History of Philosophy.
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  45. The Prolegomena and the Critiques of Pure Reason.Gary Hatfield - 2001 - In Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. New York: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 185-208.
    This chapter considers Kant's relation to Hume as Kant himself understood it when he wrote the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena. It first seeks to refine the question of Kant's relation to Hume's skepticism, and it then considers the evidence for Kant's attitude toward Hume in three works: the A Critique, Prolegomena, and B Critique. It argues that in the A Critique Kant viewed skepticism positively, as a necessary reaction to dogmatism and a spur toward critique. In his (...)
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  46. Repliek op de kritiek van de Boer, Blomme, van den Berg en Spigt.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 80 (2):363-378.
    In this article, I respond to critiques of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). I address issues that are raised concerning objectivity, the nature of the object, the role of transcendental apperception and the imagination, and idealism. More in particular I respond to an objection against my reading of the necessary existence of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. I also briefly respond to a question that relates (...)
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  47. Kant's Threefold Synthesis On a Moderately Conceptualist Interpretation.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Kant's Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. London, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 257-293.
    In this chapter I advance a moderately conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction. Often the first version of TD, the A-Deduction, is thought to be less conceptualist than the later B-version from 1787 (e.g. Heidegger 1991, 1995). Certainly, it seems that in the B-Deduction Kant puts more emphasis on the role of the understanding in determining the manifold of representations in intuition than he does in the A-Deduction. It also appears (...)
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  48. Concepts of Objects as Prescribing Laws: A Kantian and Pragmatist Line of Thought.James O'Shea - 2016 - In Robert Stern and Gabriele Gava, eds., Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy (London: Routledge): pp. 196–216. London, UK: pp. 196-216.
    Abstract: This paper traces a Kantian and pragmatist line of thinking that connects the ideas of conceptual content, object cognition, and modal constraints in the form of counterfactual sustaining causal laws. It is an idea that extends from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason through C. I. Lewis’s Mind and the World-Order to the Kantian naturalism of Wilfrid Sellars and the analytic pragmatism of Robert Brandom. Kant put forward what I characterize as a modal conception of objectivity, which he developed as (...)
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  49. The Principles of Apperception.Corey W. Dyck - 2017 - In Giuseppe Motta & Udo Thiel (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte). DeGruyter. pp. 32-46.
    In this paper, I argue that there are multiple principles of apperception which jointly constitute the foundation of Kant's argument in the transcendental deduction.
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  50. Kant's Reform of Metaphysics: The Critique of Pure Reason Reconsidered.Karin de Boer - 2020 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    Scholarly debates on the Critique of Pure Reason have largely been shaped by epistemological questions. Challenging this prevailing trend, Kant's Reform of Metaphysics is the first book-length study to interpret Kant's Critique in view of his efforts to turn Christian Wolff's highly influential metaphysics into a science. Karin de Boer situates Kant's pivotal work in the context of eighteenth-century German philosophy, traces the development of Kant's conception of critique, and offers fresh and in-depth analyses of key parts of the Critique (...)
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