Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience

Kant-Studien 104 (3):277-300 (2013)
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Abstract
We are able to think of empirical objects as capable of existing unperceived. What explains our grasp of this conception of objects? In this paper I examine the claim that experience explains our understanding of objects as capable of existing unperceived with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that standard accounts of experience’s explanatory role are unsatisfactory, but that an alternative account can be extracted from the first Critique – one which relies on Kant’s transcendental idealism.
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Archival date: 2017-10-23
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Kant on Perceptual Content.Colin McLear - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):95-144.

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2011-10-17

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