Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience

Kant-Studien 104 (3):277-300 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
We are able to think of empirical objects as capable of existing unperceived. What explains our grasp of this conception of objects? In this paper I examine the claim that experience explains our understanding of objects as capable of existing unperceived with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that standard accounts of experience’s explanatory role are unsatisfactory, but that an alternative account can be extracted from the first Critique – one which relies on Kant’s transcendental idealism.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GOMKAT
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-10-23
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2011-10-17

Total views
404 ( #10,410 of 48,952 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #19,563 of 48,952 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.