É a identidade fundamental?

Dissertation, Federal University of Santa Catarina (2016)
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Abstract
Identity is traditionally taken to be a fundamental notion of our conceptual framework as well as a fundamental metaphysical component of entities. But as far as we make this claim we face ourselves with two problems: what is identity? And why would it be fundamental? These questions will guide us towards a discussion put forward by Bueno (2014), Krause and Arenhart (2015). Bueno holds that there are four aspects that make identity being fundamental: (1) identity is assumed in every conceptual system; (2) it is required for a minimal characterisation of being an individual; (3) it cannot be defined; and (4) identity is required for quantification. On the other hand, Krause and Arenhart refuse the thesis that identity is fundamental replying to Bueno's arguments. In this dissertation we will deal with this debate. In the introduction we will deal with the first problem what is identity? , showing how this concept is traditionally understood, either for its metaphysical characteristics as for its formal account. After that we will deal with each of the four aspects defended by Bueno and challenged by Krause and Arenhart. After a critical presentation of each position we will also provide other arguments for the current debate. Finally we will outline an alternative view to those defended throughout this work.
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