Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering

In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Conceptual Engineering alleges that philosophical problems are best treated via revising or replacing our concepts (or words). The goal here is not to defend Conceptual Engineering but rather show that it can (and should) invoke Neutralism—the broad view that philosophical progress can take place when (and sometimes only when) a thoroughly neutral, non-specific theory, treatment, or methodology is adopted. A neutralist treatment of one form of skepticism is used as a case study and is compared with various non-neutral rivals. Along the way, a new taxonomy for paradox is proposed.
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First archival date: 2018-02-13
Latest version: 2 (2018-03-27)
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Doing Without Concepts.Machery, Edouard
Truth.Horwich, Paul

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