Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion

In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. Upshot: 'knows' is neither context-sensitive nor perspectival.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GRETNA-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2010-08-18
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Assessment Sensitivity.Ferrari, Filippo

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2010-08-18

Total views
593 ( #4,338 of 41,542 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
68 ( #8,011 of 41,542 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.