Probabilistic representations in perception: Are there any, and what would they be?

Mind and Language 35 (3):377-389 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Nick Shea’s Representation in Cognitive Science commits him to representations in perceptual processing that are about probabilities. This commentary concerns how to adjudicate between this view and an alternative that locates the probabilities rather in the representational states’ associated “attitudes”. As background and motivation, evidence for probabilistic representations in perceptual processing is adduced, and it is shown how, on either conception, one can address a specific challenge Ned Block has raised to this evidence.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GROPRI
Revision history
Archival date: 2020-01-17
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
Perceptual Confidence.John Morrison - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):15-48.
Bayesian Brains Without Probabilities.Sanborn, Adam N. & Chater, Nick

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2020-01-17

Total views
125 ( #29,588 of 50,201 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
125 ( #3,704 of 50,201 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.