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  1. added 2019-03-04
    New Foundations for Qualitative Physics.Jean Petitot & Barry Smith - 1990 - In J. E. Tiles, G. T. McKee & C. G. Dean (eds.), Evolving Knowledge in Natural Science and Artificial Intelligence. London: Pitman Publishing. pp. 231-49.
    Physical reality is all the reality we have, and so physical theory in the standard sense is all the ontology we need. This, at least, was an assumption taken almost universally for granted by the advocates of exact philosophy for much of the present century. Every event, it was held, is a physical event, and all structure in reality is physical structure. The grip of this assumption has perhaps been gradually weakened in recent years as far as the sciences of (...)
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  2. added 2019-01-04
    Metacognition in Multisensory Perception.Ophelia Deroy, Charles Spence & Uta Noppeney - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (10):736-747.
    Are two senses more certain than one? Subjective confidence, as an instance of metacognition, has mostly been investigated on a sense-by-sense basis. Yet perception is most frequently multisensory. Here we consider the implications and relevance of understanding confidence at the multisensory level.
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  3. added 2018-12-04
    Cézanne - Van Gogh - Monet. Genese der Abstraktion, second editon of PhD thesis from 1999/2000.Martina Sauer - 2014 - Heidelberg: ART-Dok.
    Do abstract paintings still make sense and if so what do they mean? By reducing the paintings to simple square blots as by Cézanne, to lines as by van Gogh and color traces as by Monet their meaning is fundamentally questioned. But by interpreting these compositions as effective forces or rather affective stimuli a new and different meaning becomes apparent. Landscapes are no longer introduced but made real in the aesthetic experience. Therefore aesthetics or rather aisthetics (perception) can be defined (...)
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  4. added 2017-06-24
    What is the Sense of Ego-Maker in Classical Samkhya and Yoga?Marzenna Jakubczak - 2013 - In Psychology & Psychoanalysis. History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, vol. 13, part 3. New Delhi, India: Munshiram Monoharlal. pp. 291-308.
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  5. added 2017-06-15
    Perceptual Consciousness, Short-Term Memory, and Overflow: Replies to Beck, Orlandi and Franklin, and Phillips.Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum - 2017 - The Brains Blog.
    A reply to commentators -- Jake Beck, Nico Orlandi and Aaron Franklin, and Ian Phillips -- on our paper "Does perceptual consciousness overflow cognitive access?".
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  6. added 2016-12-12
    Embodied Mind and Phenomenal Consciousness.Venieri Maria - 2015 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 5 (1):9-24.
    In recent years, a central debate in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science concerns the role of the body in perception and cognition. For many contemporary philosophers, not only cognition but also perception is connected mainly with the brain, where the processing of input from the senses takes place; whereas for the proponents of ‘embodied cognition’ other aspects of the body beyond the brain, including the environment, play a constitutive role in cognitive processes. In terms of perception, a new (...)
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  7. added 2015-08-27
    Form, Qualia and Time: The Hard Problem Reformed.Stephen E. Robbins - 2013 - Mind and Matter 2:153-181.
    The hard problem – focusing essentially on vision here – is in fact the problem of the origin of our image of the external world. This formulation in terms of the “image” is never seen stated, for the forms populating our image of the world are considered computable, and not considered qualia – the “redness” of the cube is the problem, not the cube as form. Form, however, cannot be divorced from motion and hence from time. Therefore we must examine (...)
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  8. added 2014-03-18
    Sense-Data and the Mind–Body Problem.Gary Hatfield - 2004 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis. pp. 305--331.
    The first two sections of the paper characterize the nineteenth century respect for the phenomenal by considering Helmholtz’s position and James’ and Russell’s move to neutral monism. The third section displays a moment’s sympathy with those who recoiled from the latter view -- but only a moment’s. The recoil overshot what was a reasonable response, and denied the reality of the phenomenal, largely in the name of the physical or the material. The final two sections of the paper develop a (...)
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  9. added 2012-09-06
    Time & Consciousness: Two Faces of One Mystery.Gregory Nixon (ed.) - 2010 - QuantumDream.
    In what follows, I suggest that, against most theories of time, there really is an actual present, a now, but that such an eternal moment cannot be found before or after time. It may even be semantically incoherent to say that such an eternal present exists since “it” is changeless and formless (presumably a dynamic chaos without location or duration) yet with creative potential. Such a field of near-infinite potential energy could have had no beginning and will have no end, (...)
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  10. added 2012-08-30
    Reality and Concepts (in French).Francois-Igor Pris - forthcoming - AL-MUKHATABAT المخاطبات Revue Philosophique de Logique Et d'Epistémologie مجلّة فلسفية في المنطق و الإبستمولوجيا Philosophical Journal For Logic and Epistemology.
    I present the new realist philosophy by Jocelyn Benoist, in particular, his solution to the problem of the explanatory gap in the philosophy of mind.
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  11. added 2012-06-29
    Perceptual and Imaginative Conception: The Distinction Reid Missed.Marina Folescu - 2015 - In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 52-74.
    The present investigation concerns Reid’s explanation of how objects (be they real or nonexistent) are conceived. This paper shows that there is a deep-rooted tension in Reid’s understanding of conception: although the type of conception employed in perception is closely related to the one employed in imagination, three fundamental features distinguish perceptual conception (as the former will be referred to throughout this paper) from imaginative conception (as the latter will be called henceforth). These features would have been ascribed by Reid (...)
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  12. added 2011-09-08
    Cognition, Modules, and Modes of Perception.Tista Bagchi - manuscript
    Perceptual and recursion-based faculties have long been recognized to be vital constituents of human (and, in general, animal) cognition. However, certain faculties such as the visual and the linguistic faculty have come to receive far more academic and experimental attention, in recent decades, than other recognized categories of faculties. This paper seeks to highlight the imbalance in these studies and bring into sharper focus the need for further in-depth philosophical treatments of faculties such as especially hearing, touch, and proprioception, besides (...)
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  13. added 2010-10-06
    Everyday Thinking About Bodily Sensations.Todd Ganson & Dorit Ganson - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):523-534.
    In the opening section of this paper we spell out an account of our na ve view of bodily sensations that is of historical and philosophical significance. This account of our shared view of bodily sensations captures common ground between Descartes, who endorses an error theory regarding our everyday thinking about bodily sensations, and Berkeley, who is more sympathetic with common sense. In the second part of the paper we develop an alternative to this account and discuss what is at (...)
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  14. added 2010-08-13
    Color Within an Internalist Framework : The Role of Color in the Structure of the Perceptual System.Rainer Mausfeld - 2010 - In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press.
    Colour is, according to prevailing orthodoxy in perceptual psychology, a kind of autonomous and unitary attribute. It is regarded as unitary or homogeneous by assuming that its core properties do not depend on the type of ‘perceptual object’ to which it pertains and that‘colour per se’ constitutes a natural attribute in the functional architecture of the perceptual system. It is regarded as autonomous by assuming that it can be studied in isolation of other perceptual attributes. These assumptions also provide the (...)
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  15. added 2010-08-13
    The Dual Coding of Colour.Rainer Mausfeld - 2003 - In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press. pp. 381--430.
    The chapter argues from an ethology-inspired internalist perspective that ‘colour’ is not a homogeneous and autonomous attribute, but rather plays different roles in different conceptual forms underlying perception. It discusses empirical and theoretical evidence that indicates that core assumptions underlying orthodox conceptions are grossly inadequate. The assumptions pertain to the idea that colour is a kind of autonomous and unitary attribute. It is regarded as unitary or homogeneous by assuming that its core properties do not depend on the type of (...)
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  16. added 2010-07-07
    Something Mental is Just in the Head, and What the Mental Out of the Head is Like.Arvan Marcus - manuscript
    In, “Why Nothing Mental is Just in The Head,” Justin Fisher (Noȗs, 2007) uses a novel thought-experiment to argue that every form of mental internalism is false. This paper shows that Fisher fails to refute mental internalism, and that a new variant of his example actually (a) confirms a form of mental internalism, as well as (b) John Locke's “resemblance thesis,” thereby (c) disconfirming all externalist theories of mental content (the type of theory Fisher takes his original example to prove).
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