Constructivism, intersubjectivity, provability, and triviality

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):515-527 (2019)
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Sharon Street defines her constructivism about practical reasons as the view that whether something is a reason to do a certain thing for a given agent depends on that agent’s normative point of view. However, Street has also maintained that there is a judgment about practical reasons which is true relative to every possible normative point of view, namely constructivism itself. I show that the latter thesis is inconsistent with Street’s own constructivism about epistemic reasons and discuss some consequences of this incompatibility.

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Andrea Guardo
Università degli Studi di Milano


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