Robots, Autonomy, and Responsibility

In Johanna Seibt, Marco Nørskov & Søren Schack Andersen (eds.), What Social Robots Can and Should Do: Proceedings of Robophilosophy 2016. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press. pp. 145-154 (2016)
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Abstract
We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions for agents fit to be held responsible in a normative sense, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. On the basis of Alfred R. Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility it can be argued that even if robots were to have all the capacities usually required of moral agency, their history as products of engineering would undermine their autonomy and thus responsibility.
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2018-08-03

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