Reasons for Belief
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318 (2006)
Abstract
Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is presupposed in Davidson's claim. While I focus on McDowell's view, the argument generalizes to other views which take experiences as reasons for belief.
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0031-8205
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HANRFB
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Archival date: 2012-02-10
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2009-01-28
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643 ( #10,756 of 69,985 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #40,088 of 69,985 )
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