A sartrean critique of introspection

In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. New York: Routledge (2010)
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Sartre draws a sharp distinction between consciousness, on the one hand, and inner sense or knowledge of (it)self, on the other: ‘La conscience n’est pas un mode de connaisance particullier, appelé sens intime ou connaisance de soi’ (B& N: 7). I explore in detail the meaning of the terms involved in that distinction with a view to highlight its significance.

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Anthony Hatzimoysis
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens


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