The case against unconscious emotions

Analysis 67 (4):292–299 (2007)
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Abstract

Talk of the unconscious in the philosophy of emotions concerns twothings. It can refer to an emotion whose existence is not in any way presentto consciousness. Or, it can refer to emotional phenomena whose meaning lies in the unconscious. My interest here is in the former issue of whether emotional states can exceed the reach of conscious awareness. I start with a presentation of psychoanalytic views that inform contemporary work toward a cognitivist analysis of emotion. The discussion of cognitivism leads to a consideration of work in experimental psychology that appears to establish the reality of emotional phenomena that transcend conscious awareness. However, I argue that a careful consideration of the relevant evidence falls short of supporting the claim that there are unconscious emotions

Author's Profile

Anthony Hatzimoysis
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

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