Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge

Logos and Episteme 6 (3):309-311 (2015)
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Abstract
I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Briggs and Nolan (2012), and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Adams and Clarke (2005).
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First archival date: 2015-09-09
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