Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge

Logos and Episteme 6 (3):309-311 (2015)
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Abstract
I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Briggs and Nolan (2012), and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Adams and Clarke (2005).
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First archival date: 2015-09-09
Latest version: 3 (2017-01-09)
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References found in this work BETA
Resurrecting the Tracking Theories.Adams, Fred & Clarke, Murray
Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know.Briggs, Rachael & Nolan, Daniel

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Citations of this work BETA
Beat the (Backward) Clock.Adams, Fred; Barker, John A. & Clarke, Murray
Knowledge as Fact-Tracking True Belief.Adams, Fred; Barker, John A. & Clarke, Murray

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