Perception Is Not Always and Everywhere Inferential

Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):184-188 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper argues that it is possible to embrace the predictive processing framework without reducing affordances to inferential perception. The cognitivist account of PP contends that it can capture relational perception, such as affordances. The rationale for this claim is that over time, sensory data becomes highly-weighted. This paper, however, will show the inconsistency of this claim in the face of the cognitivist premise that ‘encapsulated’ models can throw away ‘the body, the world, or other people’ [Hohwy 2016: 265]. It is then showed how it is possible to embrace a non-cognitivist reading of PP—one that does not need to reduce affordances to representational content.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HIPPIN
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-05-07
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-05-06

Total views
97 ( #39,492 of 57,026 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #24,826 of 57,026 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.