Goodness-Fixing Isn’t Good Enough: A Reply to McHugh and Way

Mind 128 (512):1309-1318 (2019)
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Abstract

According to McHugh and Way reasoning is a person-level attitude revision that is regulated by its constitutive aim of getting fitting attitudes. They claim that this account offers an explanation of what is wrong with reasoning in ways one believes to be bad and that this explanation is an alternative to an explanation that appeals to the so-called Taking Condition. I argue that their explanation is unsatisfying.

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Ulf Hlobil
Concordia University

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