The Semantic Theory of Truth: Field’s Incompleteness Objection

Philosophia 35 (2):161-170 (2007)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2) it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to pass muster, I argue that, within the constraints of a non-reductive physicalism and a holism concerning the concepts of truth, reference and meaning, conceding Field’s physicalistic inadequacy conclusion while rejecting his conceptual deficiency conclusion is a promising reply to the incompleteness objection.
Keywords
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HOFTST-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2012-10-18
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
460 ( #9,341 of 51,565 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #14,337 of 51,565 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.