Lying and knowing

Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371 (2019)
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Abstract
This paper defends the simple view that in asserting that p, one lies iff one knows that p is false. Along the way it draws some morals about deception, knowledge, Gettier cases, belief, assertion, and the relationship between first- and higher-order norms.
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HOLLAK-3
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Archival date: 2019-10-04
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2019-10-04

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