Lying and knowing

Synthese:1-21 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
This paper defends the simple view that in asserting that p, one lies iff one knows that p is false. Along the way it draws some morals about deception, knowledge, Gettier cases, belief, assertion, and the relationship between first- and higher-order norms.
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HOLLAK-3
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Archival date: 2019-10-04
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References found in this work BETA
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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2019-10-04

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