Not Esoteric, Just Fallible: Comment on Starmans and Friedman About Philosophical Expertise

Cognitive Science 44 (10):e12896 (2020)
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Abstract

Gettier cases are scenarios conceived by philosophers to demonstrate that justified true beliefs may not be knowledge. Starmans and Friedman (2020) find that philosophers attribute knowledge in Gettier cases differently from laypeople and non‐philosophy academics, which seems to suggest that philosophers may be indoctrinated to adopt an esoteric concept of knowledge. I argue to the contrary: Their finding at most shows that philosophical reflection is fallible, but nevertheless able to clarify the concept of knowledge. I also suggest that their experiments could be modified to help determine when philosophical reflection might yield plausible results.

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Tsung-Hsing Ho (何宗興)
National Chung Cheng University

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