Results for 'Gettier problem'

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  1. The Gettier Problem.Ian M. Church - 2019 - In The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York, USA: pp. 261-271.
    In this chapter, we will explore the luck at issue in Gettier-styled counterexamples and the subsequent problem it poses to any viable reductive analysis of knowledge. In the 1st section, we will consider the specific species of luck that is at issue in Gettier counterexamples, then, in the next section, I will briefly sketch a diagnosis of the Gettier Problem and try to explain why the relevant species of luck has proven to be extremely difficult (...)
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  2. Warum das Gettier-Problem kein Scheinproblem ist.Sven Bernecker - 2013 - In Gerhard Ernst & Lisa Marani (eds.), Das Gettierproblem: Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren. Paderborn, Germany: Mentis. pp. 29-48.
    Wie der Titel des Aufsatzes bereits signalisiert, werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass das Gettier-Problem ein genuines Problem ist, keines, das sich lediglich einer falschen Fragestellung verdankt. Versuche, das Gettier-Problem aufzulösen statt zu lösen, sind zum Scheitern verurteilt. In den ersten beiden Abschnitten wird eine Typologisierung von Gettier-Fällen vorgenommen und zwischen zwei Lesarten des Gettier-Problems unterschieden. Im dritten Abschnitt werden einige Auflösungsversuche des Gettier-Problems der kritischen Prüfung unterzogen. Der vierte Abschnitt diskutiert die reliabilistische (...)
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  3. Knowledge as a Thick Concept: Explaining Why the Gettier Problem Arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.
    The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. But, whether or not this problem is resolvable, we still must face an important question: Why does the Gettier problem arise in the first place? So far, philosophers have seen it as either a problem peculiar to the concept of knowledge, or else an instance of a general problem about conceptual analysis. But I would like to steer a middle course. I argue that the Gettier (...) arises because knowledge is a thick concept, and a Gettier-like problem is just what we should expect from attempts at analyzing a thick concept. Section 2 is devoted to establishing the controversial claim that knowledge is thick, and, in Sect. 3, I show that there is a general problem for analyzing thick concepts of which the Gettier problem is a special instance. I do not take a stand on whether the Gettier problem, or its general counterpart, is resolvable. My primary aim is to bring these problems into better focus. (shrink)
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  4. Intemalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism.Mylan Engel - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1):99-117.
    When it comes to second-order knowledge, internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this internalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for internalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the thesis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one internalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological second-order level, the Gettier problem generates three distinct problems (...)
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  5. Was lehrt uns das Gettier-Problem über das Verhältnis zwischen Intuitionen und Begriffsanalysen?Geert Keil - 2013 - In Gerhard Ernst & Lisa Marani (eds.), Das Gettierproblem. Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren. Mentis. pp. 107-144.
    Der Beitrag beleuchtet einen bisher kaum gewürdigten Grund dafür, dass die Gettier-Debatte nicht zu einer systematisch verbesserten Analyse des Wissensbegriffs geführt hat. Es wird die These entwickelt und verteidigt, dass diejenigen Komplikationen, die einen Gettierfall zu einem solchen machen, sich stets in den blinden Flecken der Situationsrepräsentation des epistemischen Subjekts befinden. Diese These ist in die metaphilosophische Fragestellung eingebettet, was das Gettierproblem uns über das Verhältnis von sprachlichen Intuitionen und Begriffsanalysen lehrt. Es gibt unter kompetenten Sprechern beträchtliche Einmütigkeit darüber, (...)
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  6.  96
    Resolving the Gettier Problem in the Smith Case: The Donnellan Linguistic Approach.Joseph Martin M. Jose & Mabaquiao Jr - 2018 - Kritike 12 (2):108-125.
    In this paper, we contend that the “Smith case” in Gettier’s attempt to refute the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge does not work. This is because the said case fails to satisfy the truth condition, and thus is not a case of JTB at all. We demonstrate this claim using the framework of Donnellan’s distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. Accordingly, the truth value of Smith’s proposition “The man who will get the job (...)
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  7. A Gricean Approach to the Gettier Problem.Allan Hazlett - manuscript
    David Lewis maintained that epistemological contextualism (on which the truth-conditions for utterances of “S knows p” change in different contexts depending on the salient “alternative possibilities”) could solve the problem of skepticism as well as the Gettier problem. Contextualist approaches to skepticism have become commonplace, if not orthodox, in epistemology. But not so for contextualist approaches to the Gettier problem: the standard approach to this has been to add an “anti-luck” condition to the analysis of (...)
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  8. Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology, Epistemic Normativity and the Gettier Problem.Qilin Li - manuscript
    In this paper, it is argued that there are (at least) two different kinds of ‘epistemic normativity’ in epistemology, which can be scrutinized and revealed by some comparison with some naturalistic studies of ethics. The first kind of epistemic normativity can be naturalized, but the other not. The doctrines of Quine’s naturalized epistemology is firstly introduced; then Kim’s critique of Quine’s proposal is examined. It is argued that Quine’s naturalized epistemology is able to save some room for the concept of (...)
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  9. Episteme and Subjectivity: The Context Does Not Solve the “Gettier Problem”.Dimitry Mentuz - 2017 - Austrian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 3:77-82.
    Objective: In this essay, I will try to track some historical and modern stages of the discussion on the Gettier problem, and point out the interrelations of the questions that this problem raises for epistemologists, with sceptical arguments, and a so-called problem of relevance. Methods: historical analysis, induction, generalization, deduction, discourse, intuition results: Albeit the contextual theories of knowledge, the use of different definitions of knowledge, and the different ways of the uses of knowledge do not (...)
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  10. Truth-Maker Theory and the Stopped Clock: Why Heathcote Fails to Solve the Gettier Problem.Qilin Li - manuscript
    Adrian Heathcote has proposed a truth-making account of knowledge that combines traditional conditions of justified true belief with the truth-making condition, which would jointly provide us with the sufficient condition of knowledge, and this truth-maker account of knowledge in turn explains why a gettiered justified true belief fails to be regarded as a genuine instance of knowledge. In this paper, by the comparison of two different casual models that are illustrated by the thermometer and the clock respectively, however, it will (...)
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  11. Non-Pickwickian Belief and 'the Gettier Problem'.John Biro - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):47-69.
    That in Gettier's alleged counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief the belief condition is satisfied has rarely been questioned. Yet there is reason to doubt that a rational person would come to believe what Gettier's protagonists are said to believe in the way they are said to have come to believe it. If they would not, the examples are not counter-examples to the traditional analysis. I go on to discuss a number of examples (...)
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  12.  83
    Getting Gettier Straight: Thought Experiments, Deviant Realizations and Default Interpretations.Pierre Saint-Germier - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1783-1806.
    It has been pointed out that Gettier case scenarios have deviant realizations and that deviant realizations raise a difficulty for the logical analysis of thought experiments. Grundmann and Horvath have shown that it is possible to rule out deviant realizations by suitably modifying the scenario of a Gettier-style thought experiment. They hypothesize further that the enriched scenario corresponds to the way expert epistemologists implicitly interpret the original one. However, no precise account of this implicit enrichment is offered, which (...)
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  13. Experimental Epistemology and "Gettier" Cases.John Turri - 2019 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), The Gettier Problem. Cambridge University Press. pp. 199-217.
    This chapter reviews some faults of the theoretical literature and findings from the experimental literature on “Gettier” cases. Some “Gettier” cases are so poorly constructed that they are unsuitable for serious study. Some longstanding assumptions about how people tend to judge “Gettier” cases are false. Some “Gettier” cases are judged similarly to paradigmatic ignorance, whereas others are judged similarly to paradigmatic knowledge, rendering it a theoretically useless category. Experimental procedures can affect how people judge “Gettier (...)
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  14. Truth Analysis of the Gettier Argument.Yussif Yakubu - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):449-466.
    Gettier presented the now famous Gettier problem as a challenge to epistemology. The methods Gettier used to construct his challenge, however, utilized certain principles of formal logic that are actually inappropriate for the natural language discourse of the Gettier cases. In that challenge to epistemology, Gettier also makes truth claims that would be considered controversial in analytic philosophy of language. The Gettier challenge has escaped scrutiny in these other relevant academic disciplines, however, because (...)
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  15. Infallibilism and Gettier’s Legacy.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its (...)
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  16. Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism: Between Gettier Cases and Saving Epistemic Appearances.Christos Kyriacou - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:27-44.
    I present an argument for a sophisticated version of sceptical invariantism that has so far gone unnoticed: Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that it can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem, address the dogmatism paradox and, on the other hand, show some due respect to the Moorean methodological incentive of ‘saving epistemic appearances’. A fortiori, BSI promises to reap some other important explanatory fruit that I go on to adduce (e.g. account for concessive knowledge attributions). (...)
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  17.  42
    In Gettier's Wake.John Turri - 2012 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology: the key thinkers. London, England: Continuum.
    A critical review of “Gettier” cases and theoretical attempts to solve “the” "Gettier" "problem".
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  18. Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy.Peter Blouw, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2017 - In R. Borges, C. de Almeida & P. Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press. pp. 242-252.
    The term “Gettier Case” is a technical term frequently applied to a wide array of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology. What do these cases have in common? It is said that they all involve a justified true belief which, intuitively, is not knowledge, due to a form of luck called “Gettiering.” While this very broad characterization suffices for some purposes, it masks radical diversity. We argue that the extent of this diversity merits abandoning the notion of a “Gettier (...)
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  19.  55
    Knowledge Judgments in “Gettier” Cases.John Turri - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A companion to experimental philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 337-348.
    Gettier cases” have played a major role in Anglo-American analytic epistemology over the past fifty years. Philosophers have grouped a bewildering array of examples under the heading “Gettier case.” Philosophers claim that these cases are obvious counterexamples to the “traditional” analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, and they treat correctly classifying the cases as a criterion for judging proposed theories of knowledge. Cognitive scientists recently began testing whether philosophers are right about these cases. It turns out that (...)
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  20. How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge.Rodrigo Borges - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (2):133-140.
    The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in (...)
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  21. What is True. Gettier Cases and the Problem of Truth.Henk bij de Weg - manuscript
    One of the most discussed articles in the theory of knowledge is Edmund Gettier’s article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, published in 1963. In this article Gettier undermined the view that knowledge is justified true belief. I think that Gettier’s analysis has consequences not only for the question what knowledge is but also for our idea of truth. In this paper I argue that an analysis in the sense of Gettier shows that a statement can be (...)
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  22. Perceptual Capacities, Knowledge, and Gettier Cases.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - In Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 74-95.
    This paper argues for a sufficient evidence condition on knowledge and I argue that there is no belief condition on knowledge.
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  23.  96
    Knowledge as a Thick Concept: New Light on the Gettier and Value Problems.Brent G. Kyle - 2011 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    I argue that knowledge is a particular kind of concept known as a thick concept. Examples of thick concepts include courage, generosity, loyalty, brutality, and so forth. These concepts are commonly said to combine both evaluation and description, and one of the main goals of this dissertation is to provide a new account of how a thick concept combines these elements. It is argued that thick concepts are semantically evaluative, and that they combine evaluation and description in a way similar (...)
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  24. Intuition in Gettier.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Classic Philosophical Arguments: The Gettier Problem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Presss.
    Gettier’s paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” is widely taken to be a paradigm example of the sort of philosophical methodology that has been so hotly debated in the recent literature. Reflection on it motivates the following four theses about that methodology: (A) Intuitive judgments form an epistemically distinctive kind. (B) Intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology. (C) If intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology, then their role is to be taken (...)
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  25. Some Reflections on Gettier's Problem.Azam Golam - 2006 - The Dhaka University Studies,June 2006 (1):83-97.
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  26. Gettier and Externalism.Rodrigo Borges - forthcoming - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), The Gettier Problem.
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  27.  69
    Gettier Problems and Logical Properties of Justification.Vaclav Rajlich - manuscript
    In the classical account of knowledge, S knows that P if and only if S believes that P, S is justified in believing that P, and P is true (JTB).. In 1963, Gettier presented two problems that casted doubt on this account. Since then, numerous authors proposed modifications or clarifications of JTB, however, these efforts have not produced a satis-factory solution. In this paper, the focus is on logical properties of justification. The Get-tier problem Case II is expressed (...)
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  28. What is the Benacerraf Problem?Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - In Fabrice Pataut (ed.), New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity. Springer Verlag.
    In "Mathematical Truth", Paul Benacerraf articulated an epistemological problem for mathematical realism. His formulation of the problem relied on a causal theory of knowledge which is now widely rejected. But it is generally agreed that Benacerraf was onto a genuine problem for mathematical realism nevertheless. Hartry Field describes it as the problem of explaining the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, realistically construed. In this paper, I argue that the Benacerraf Problem cannot be made out. There (...)
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  29.  79
    Die identifikationistische Lösung des Gettier Problems.Sven Bernecker - 2015 - In Dirk Koppelberg & Stefan Tolksdorf (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie -- Wie und Wozu? Munster, Germany: Mentis. pp. 189-214.
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  30. The Problem of Contingency for Religious Belief.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - Faith and Philosophy 30 (4):371-392.
    In this paper, I hope to solve a problem that’s as old as the hills: the problem of contingency for religious belief. Paradigmatic examples of this argument begin with a counterfactual premise: had we been born at a different time or in a difference place, we easily could have held different beliefs on religious topics. Ultimately, and perhaps by additional steps, we’re meant to reach the skeptical conclusion that very many of our religious beliefs do not amount to (...)
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  31. The Truthmaker Solution to the Gettier Problems.Alessandro Giordani - 2015 - Epistemologia 38:66-78.
    A truthmaker solution to the Gettier problems is based on the idea that knowledge can be defined as justified true belief provided that the source of one’s justification is suitably connected with what makes the believed proposition true. Different developments of this basic intuition have been recently criticized on the basis of a series of arguments aiming at showing that no truthmaker theory can allow us to solve Gettier problems, since the very idea underlying such solution is ineffective. (...)
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  32. What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
    The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a way that is immune to Gettier counter-examples. The “Gettier Problem problem”, according to Lycan, is the problem of saying what is misguided about trying to solve the Gettier Problem. In this paper I take up the Gettier Problem problem. I distinguish giving conditions that are necessary and sufficient for knowledge (...)
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  33. On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication.Hamid Seyedsayamdost - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):95-116.
    In one of the earlier influential papers in the field of experimental philosophy titled Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions published in 2001, Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich reported that respondents answered Gettier type questions differently depending on their ethnic background as well as socioeconomic status. There is currently a debate going on, on the significance of the results of Weinberg et al. (2001) and its implications for philosophical methodology in general and epistemology in specific. Despite the debates, (...)
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  34. Are Modal Conditions Necessary for Knowledge?Mark Anthony Dacela - 2019 - Kritike 13 (1):101.
    Modal epistemic conditions have played an important role in post-Gettier theories of knowledge. These conditions purportedly eliminate the pernicious kind of luck present in all Gettier-type cases and offer a rather convincing way of refuting skepticism. This motivates the view that conditions of this sort are necessary for knowledge. I argue against this. I claim that modal conditions, particularly sensitivity and safety, are not necessary for knowledge. I do this by noting that the problem cases for both (...)
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  35. Keil. Geert - 2013 - In Gerhard Ernst Lisa Marani (ed.), Das Gettierproblem. Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren. pp. 107-144.
    Der Beitrag beleuchtet einen bisher kaum gewürdigten Grund dafür, dass die Gettier-Debatte nicht zu einer systematisch verbesserten Analyse des Wissensbegriffs geführt hat. Es wird die These entwickelt und verteidigt, dass diejenigen Komplikationen, die einen Gettierfall zu einem solchen machen, sich stets in den blinden Flecken der Situationsrepräsentation des epistemischen Subjekts befinden. Diese These ist in die metaphilosophische Fragestellung eingebettet, was das Gettierproblem uns über das Verhältnis von sprachlichen Intuitionen und Begriffsanalysen lehrt. Es gibt unter kompetenten Sprechern beträchtliche Einmütigkeit darüber, (...)
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  36. In Defense of the Kantian Account of Knowledge: Reply to Whiting.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3): 371-382.
    In this paper I defend the view that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient from an important objection due to Daniel Whiting, in this journal. Whiting argues that this view fails to deal adequately with a familiar sort of counterexample to analyses of knowledge, fake barn cases. I accept Whiting’s conclusion that my earlier paper offered an inadequate treatment of fake barn cases, but defend a new account of basic perceptual reasons that is consistent (...)
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  37. Knowledge Is NOT Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.Daniel Whiting - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):237-243.
    Mark Schroeder has recently proposed a new analysis of knowledge. I examine that analysis and show that it fails. More specifically, I show that it faces a problem all too familiar from the post-Gettier literature, namely, that it is delivers the wrong verdict in fake barn cases.
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  38. Knowledge: Value on the Cheap.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):249-263.
    ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is a problem of understanding how the property of being knowledge (...)
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  39. The Analysis of Knowledge.Brian C. Barnett - forthcoming - In Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Press. pp. Chapter 1.
    According to the traditional analysis of propositional knowledge (which derives from Plato's account in the Meno and Theaetetus), knowledge is justified true belief. This chapter develops the traditional analysis, introduces the famous Gettier and lottery problems, and provides an overview of prospective solutions. In closing, I briefly comment on the value of conceptual analysis, note how it has shaped the field, and assess the state of post-Gettier epistemology.
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  40.  64
    The Difference Between Knowledge and Understanding.Sherrilyn Roush - 2017 - Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem.
    In the aftermath of Gettier’s examples, knowledge came to be thought of as what you would have if in addition to a true belief and your favorite epistemic goody, such as justifiedness, you also were ungettiered, and the theory of knowledge was frequently equated, especially by its detractors, with the project of pinning down that extra bit. It would follow that knowledge contributes something distinctive that makes it indispensable in our pantheon of epistemic concepts only if avoiding gettierization has (...)
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  41.  42
    Not Esoteric, Just Fallible: Comment on Starmans and Friedman About Philosophical Expertise.Tsung‐Hsing Ho - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (10).
    Gettier cases are scenarios conceived by philosophers to demonstrate that justified true beliefs may not be knowledge. Starmans and Friedman (2020) find that philosophers attribute knowledge in Gettier cases differently from laypeople and non‐philosophy academics, which seems to suggest that philosophers may be indoctrinated to adopt an esoteric concept of knowledge. I argue to the contrary: Their finding at most shows that philosophical reflection is fallible, but nevertheless able to clarify the concept of knowledge. I also suggest that (...)
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  42. Epistemic Luck.Mylan Engel Jr - 2011 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-41.
    Epistemic luck is a generic notion used to describe any of a number of ways in which it can be accidental, coincidental, or fortuitous that a person has a true belief. For example, one can form a true belief as a result of a lucky guess, as when one believes through guesswork that “C” is the right answer to a multiple-choice question and one’s belief just happens to be correct. One can form a true belief via wishful thinking; for example, (...)
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  43. INVESTIGATING KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION.John Corcoran - 2014 - In A. Buchsbaum A. Koslow (ed.), The Road to Universal Logic. Vol. I. SPRINGER. pp. 95-126.
    This work treats the correlative concepts knowledge and opinion, in various senses. In all senses of ‘knowledge’ and ‘opinion’, a belief known to be true is knowledge; a belief not known to be true is opinion. In this sense of ‘belief’, a belief is a proposition thought to be true—perhaps, but not necessarily, known to be true. All knowledge is truth. Some but not all opinion is truth. Every proposition known to be true is believed to be true. Some but (...)
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  44. Sensitivity Actually.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):606-625.
    A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity “play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems”. I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since beliefs in necessary truths are sensitive by default, the resulting cases give rise to a serious explanatory problem for (...)
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  45. Close to the Truth.Peter Baumann - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1769-1775.
    We often think or say that someone was wrong about something but almost right about it or close to the truth. This can mean more than one thing. Here, I propose an analysis of the idea of being epistemically close to the truth. This idea plays an important role in our practice of epistemic evaluation and therefore deserves some detailed attention. I start with an exposition of the idea of getting things right by looking at the main forms of reliabilism (...)
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  46.  29
    No False Grounds: Overcoming Problems of Justified True Belief.Watson Britton - manuscript
    I briefly discuss the Gettier Problem, problems with the justified theory of true belief, and offer support for Feldman's concept of no false grounds.
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  47.  14
    Pragmatism, Truth and Right: Theoretical and Practical Reasoning Answered.Ali Moezzi - manuscript
    Theoretical reasoning aims at true beliefs; however, it rarely can grasp it. So, it would be plausible to define rationality in beliefs by the property of being consistent and truth-conducive. The gap between our justifications and the truth has raised a seemingly irresolvable problem in analytic epistemology called Gettierproblem. Similarly, it seems that practical reasoning aims at right actions, but it doesn't follow that the action which is based on our practical reasoning would always be the (...)
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  48. 西方当代认识论之最新发展 (New Trents in Epistemology).Xinli Wang & 王 新力 - 2008 - In Jiyuan Yu Zhiwei Zhang (ed.), 西方人文社科前沿述评-哲学卷 (Series on Western Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences - Philosophy). 中国人民大学出版社 (China Renmin University Press).
    内容提要:本文综合评述当代认识论的现状以及主干近10 年来主要发展趋势和最新理论贡献。它首先介绍一些必要的理论背景:盖梯尔难题,闭合原则,内在论与外在论之争(第2节),然后分6 节集中讨论、评述:(i) 温和基础主义的兴起及发展(第3 节) ; (ii) 对认知怀疑论的最新表述及回应(第4 节) ; (iii) 认知无限辨明论(第5 节) ;(iv) 认知语境主义的兴起,其理论贡献,以及存在的问题;(v) 德性认识论的二个模型,它们的优点,和现有的问题。最后简单讨论当代认识论面临的危机与机遇。 -/- Abstract: This article surveys the current state of affairs and some important new developments of epistemology in the past 10 years. It first introduces some necessary theoretical background (the Gettier problem, the closure principle, and internalism vs. externalism), and then focuses on (i) the rise and development of modest forms of foundationalism, (ii) recent debates on epistemic skepticism, (iii) epistemic infinitism, (iv) (...)
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  49. Timothy Williamson y el retorno a la metafísica.Alexander Valdenegro - 2011 - In Avances de Investigación.
    In this paper we present the comparative study by Jonathan Stoltz, about the similarities between Timothy Williamson's epistemology and the Indo-Tibetan epistemological traditions that developed between the eighth and thirteenth centuries, which lie above that for them the knowledge is a kind of mental state as well as a restricted study of the return to metaphysics, a name that refers to the interesting position of authority born of an attempt to overcome his classical and strong Anglo-American analytical roots.
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  50.  81
    Where Sensitivity Don't Work.Mark Anthony Dacela - 2017 - Suri 6 (2):110-123.
    Robert Nozick (1981, 172) offers the following analysis of knowledge (where S stands for subject and p for proposition): -/- D1 S knows that p =df (1) S believes p, (2) p is true, (3) if p weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that p (variation condition), and (4) If p were true, S would believe it (adherence condition). Jointly, Nozick refers to conditions 3 and 4 as the sensitivity condition: for they require that the belief be sensitive to the truth-value (...)
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