Critical Reasoning and Critical Perception

In Matthew Kieran & Dominic Lopes (eds.), Knowing Art. Springer. pp. 137-153 (2006)
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Abstract

The outcome of criticism is a perception. Does this mean that criticism cannot count as a rational process? For it to do so, it seems it would have to be possible for there to be an argument for a perception. Yet perceptions do not seem to be the right sort of item to serve as the conclusions of arguments. Is this appearance borne out? I examine why perceptions might not be able to play that role, and explore what would have to be true of critical discourse for those obstacles to be circumvented.

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Robert Hopkins
New York University

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