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  1. Means-End Reciprocity and the Aims of Education Debate.Guy Axtell - manuscript
    In the centennial year of John Dewey’s classic, Democracy and Education (1916), this paper revisits his thesis of the reciprocity of means and ends, arguing that it remains of central importance for debate over the aims of education. The paper provides a Dewey-inspired rebuttal of arguments for an ‘ultimate aim,’ but balances this with a development of the strong overlaps between proponents of pragmatism, intellectual virtues education (Jason Baehr) and critical thinking education (Harvey Siegel). Siegel’s ‘Kantian’ justification of critical thinking (...)
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  2. Théories à processus duaux et théories de l’éducation : Le cas de l’enseignement de la pensée critique et de la logique.Guillaume Beaulac & Serge Robert - 2011 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 6 (1):63-77.
    Many theories about the teaching of logic and critical thinking take for granted that theoretical learning, the learning of formal rules for example, and its practical application are sufficient to master the tools taught and to take the habit of using them. However, this way of teaching is not efficient, a conclusion supported by much work in cognitive science. Approaching cognition evolutionarily with dual-process theories allows for an explanation of these insufficiencies and offers clues on how we could teach critical (...)
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  3. A Participatory Approach to the Teaching of Critical Reasoning.Rory J. Conces - 1995 - APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy 94 (2):114-116.
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  4. Conceptual Centrality and Implicit Bias.Guillermo Del Pinal & Shannon Spaulding - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (1):95-111.
    How are biases encoded in our representations of social categories? Philosophical and empirical discussions of implicit bias overwhelmingly focus on salient or statistical associations between target features and representations of social categories. These are the sorts of associations probed by the Implicit Association Test and various priming tasks. In this paper, we argue that these discussions systematically overlook an alternative way in which biases are encoded, that is, in the dependency networks that are part of our representations of social categories. (...)
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  5. Critical Thinking: A Statement of Expert Consensus for Purposes of Educational Assessment and Instruction (The Delphi Report).Peter Facione - 1990 - Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC).
    This is the full version of the Delphi Report on critical thinking and critical thinking instruction at the post-secondary level.
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  6. Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism.Brie Gertler - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):91-109.
    How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self-knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self-knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self-knowledge, our capacity for self-knowledge derives from our (...)
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  7. Critical Reasoning and Critical Perception.Robert Hopkins - 2006 - In Matthew Kieran & Dominic Lopes (eds.), Knowing Art. Springer. pp. 137-153.
    The outcome of criticism is a perception. Does this mean that criticism cannot count as a rational process? For it to do so, it seems it would have to be possible for there to be an argument for a perception. Yet perceptions do not seem to be the right sort of item to serve as the conclusions of arguments. Is this appearance borne out? I examine why perceptions might not be able to play that role, and explore what would have (...)
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  8. A ‘Circulation Model’ of Education: A Response to Challenges of Education at the New University.Amos Keestra & Machiel Keestra - 2015 - Krisis: Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 2015 (2):90-98.
    The protests at the Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA) that began in November 2014 as a reaction to severe cuts in the department of humanities have sparked a broad debate nationally and even internationally about the future of the university and the values and ideals that should define it. It turned out that dissatisfaction was much more widespread in different parts of the university than some had previously thought, and many turned out to share the concerns first put forward in the (...)
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  9. Critical Thinking Education and Debiasing.Tim Kenyon & Guillaume Beaulac - 2014 - Informal Logic 34 (4):341-363.
    There are empirical grounds to doubt the effectiveness of a common and intuitive approach to teaching debiasing strategies in critical thinking courses. We summarize some of the grounds before suggesting a broader taxonomy of debiasing strategies. This four-level taxonomy enables a useful diagnosis of biasing factors and situations, and illuminates more strategies for more effective bias mitigation located in the shaping of situational factors and reasoning infrastructure—sometimes called “nudges” in the literature. The question, we contend, then becomes how best to (...)
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  10. Enthymemes, Argumentation Schemes, and Topics.Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton - 2009 - Logique Et Analyse 52 (205):39-56.
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  11. Common Knowledge and Argumentation Schemes .Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton - 2005 - Studies in Communication Sciences 5 (2):1-22.
    We argue that common knowledge, of the kind used in reasoning in law and computing is best analyzed using a dialogue model of argumentation (Walton & Krabbe 1995). In this model, implicit premises resting on common knowledge are analyzed as endoxa or widely accepted opinions and generalizations (Tardini 2005). We argue that, in this sense, common knowledge is not really knowledge of the kind represent by belief and/or knowledge of the epistemic kind studied in current epistemology. This paper takes a (...)
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  12. An Introduction to Interdisciplinary Research. Theory and Practice.Steph Menken, Machiel Keestra, Lucas Rutting, Ger Post, Mieke de Roo, Sylvia Blad & Linda de Greef (eds.) - 2016 - Amsterdam University Press.
    This book (128 pp.) serves as an introduction and manual to guide students through the interdisciplinary research process. We are becoming increasingly aware that, as a result of technological developments and globalisation, problems are becoming so complex that they can only be solved through cooperation between multiple disciplines. Healthcare, climate change, food security, energy, financial markets and quality of life are just a few examples of issues that require scientists and academics to work in a crossdisciplinary way. As a result (...)
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  13. On Proving Too Much.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (3):353-358.
    It is quite common to object to an argument by saying that it “proves too much.” In this paper, I argue that the “proving too much” charge can be understood in at least three different ways. I explain these three interpretations of the “proving too much” charge. I urge anyone who is inclined to level the “proving too much” charge against an argument to think about which interpretation of that charge one has in mind.
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  14. El lugar de la controversia en la argumentación.María G. Navarro - 2015 - In Fernando Leal Carretero (ed.), Argumentación y pragma-dialéctica: Estudios en honor a Frans H. van Eemeren. Guadalajara (México): Editorial Universitaria.
    La oposición a una estricta separación entre las dimensiones dialéctica y retórica de la actividad argumentativa es una de las aportaciones más destacadas y peculiares de la denominada escuela holandesa sobre argumentación. Frans H. van Eemeren y Peter Houtlosser reaccionaron contra una separación estricta entre dialéctica y retórica en varios trabajos, pero uno de los más inspiradores es sin duda su artículo “William the Silent’s argumentative discourse” (1998) presentado en la ciudad de Ámsterdam con ocasión de la cuarta conferencia organizada (...)
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  15. Reasoning in Listening.Kenneth Olson & Gilbert Plumer - 2003 - In Frans H. van Eemeren, J. Anthony Blair, Charles A. Willard & A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam: Sic Sat. pp. 803-806.
    Our thesis is that reasoning plays a greater—or at least a different—role in understanding oral discourse such as lectures and speeches than it does in understanding comparatively long written discourse. For example, both reading and listening involve framing hypotheses about the direction the discourse is headed. But since a reader can skip around to check and revise hypotheses, the reader’s stake in initially getting it right is not as great as the listener’s, who runs the risk of getting hopelessly lost. (...)
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  16. Commentary On: Marcin Lewiński’s “‘You’Re Moving From Irrelevant to Irrational’—Critical Reactions in Internet Discussion Forums”.Gilbert Plumer - 2009 - In Juho Ritola (ed.), Argument Cultures. Proceedings of the 8th OSSA Conference [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-3.
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  17. Necessary Assumptions.Gilbert Plumer - 1999 - Informal Logic 19 (1):41-61.
    In their book EVALUATING CRITICAL THINKING Stephen Norris and Robert Ennis say: “Although it is tempting to think that certain [unstated] assumptions are logically necessary for an argument or position, they are not. So do not ask for them.” Numerous writers of introductory logic texts as well as various highly visible standardized tests (e.g., the LSAT and GRE) presume that the Norris/Ennis view is wrong; the presumption is that many arguments have (unstated) necessary assumptions and that readers and test takers (...)
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  18. A Review of the LSAT Using Literature on Legal Reasoning.Gilbert E. Plumer - 2000 - Law School Admission Council Computerized Testing Report 97 (8):1-19.
    Research using current literature on legal reasoning was conducted with the goals of (a) determining what skills are most important in good legal reasoning according to such literature, (b) determining the extent to which existing Law School Admission Test item types and subtypes are designed to assess those skills, and (c) suggesting test specifications or new or refined item types and formats that could be developed in the future to assess any important skills that appear [by (a) and (b)] to (...)
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  19. Reflection On: On Reflection.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):55-69.
    In his book, On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes what he regards as a chronic tendency in philosophy towards inflating the significance of reflection in ways that manifest a combination of philosophical naiveté and scientific ignorance about how reflection actually works. In these comments, I respond to Kornblith's challenge by sketching an account of the philosophical significance of reflection in the theory of epistemic justification.
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  20. Why Justification Matters.Declan Smithies - 2015 - In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 224-244.
    This chapter is guided by the hypothesis that the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation is tied to its role in the practice of critical reflection. In section one, I propose an analysis of justification as the epistemic property in virtue of which a belief has the potential to survive ideal critical reflection. In section two, I use this analysis in arguing for a form of access internalism on which one has justification to believe (...)
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