Kantian Neuroscience and Radical Interpretation

In Festschfrift for Mark Platts (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This is an unedited version of a paper written in 2012 accepted for publication in a forthcoming Festschrift for Mark Platts. In it I argue that the Helmholtz/Bayes tradition of free energy neuroscience begun by Geoffrey Hinton and his colleagues, and now being carried forward by Karl Friston and his, can be seen as a fulfilment of the Quine/Davidson program of radical interpretation, and also of Quine’s conception of a naturalized epistemology. This program, in turn, is rooted in Helmholtz’s scientific reconception of Kant’s notion of a concept-led synthesis of affectations by an extra-sensory reality that creates human self-consciousness, a topic previously discussed in my (2012) Psychoanalysis, Representation, and Neuroscience. I also argue that 20th century analytical philosophy went astray when Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein ignored their legacy from Helmholtz and espoused a conception of perception and epistemology that he had already shown to be false.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HOPKNA
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-08-06
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-08-06

Total downloads
123 ( #18,296 of 36,572 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #17,022 of 36,572 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.