La Chose En Soi Comme Concept "Critique" : Le Problème de la Limitation de la Connaissance Dans la Critique de la Raison Pure de Kant

Dissertation, Université de Montréal (2014)
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In the following thesis, we will claim that Kant’s concept of a thing-in-itself is both a metaphysical and a critical concept. Accordingly, the thing-in-itself must be understood as a real transcendental object that grounds phenomena. Thus, we maintain – contrary to F.H. Jacobi’s and G.E. Schulze’s harsh objections – that this assertion does not violate the structures of critical philosophy. Indeed, this particular claim is arrived at through analogical cognition, which does not transgress the boundaries of human knowledge: as a matter of fact, analogical cognition allows us to point towards and assert the existence of something the nature of which may remain problematic. Thus, we believe that Kant’s metaphysical commitment with regard to the existence of the thing-in-itself as ground of phenomena can be fully justified within the Critique of Pure Reason

Author's Profile

Maria Hotes
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München


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