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Maria Hotes
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
  1. Du chien au philosophe : L'analogie du chien chez Diogène et Platon.Maria Hotes - 2014 - Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 32 (1):03-33.
    In this article, the author examines how Diogenes of Sinope and Plato employed the analogy of the dog in order to illustrate two very different conceptions of the philosopher. Although in both cases the analogy of the dog is used to exemplify and explain certain moral or psychological characteristics of the philosopher, the author argues that the differences between Diogenes’ and Plato’s usages of the analogy are both more essential and more philosophically significant. Thus, against those scholars who claim that (...)
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  2. Criticisme et chose en soi chez Kant et Fichte.Maria Hotes - 2012 - Horizon Sociologique 6:01-26.
    In 1797, subsequent to Jacobi’s (1787) and Schulze’s (1792) objections against Kantian criticism, Fichte intends to “save” critical philosophy by evacuating the thing in itself of theoretical discourse. By doing this, Fichte sets out to develop a coherent – and definitive – version of critical philosophy, which amounts to a radicalised account of transcendental idealism. Yet, two years later (1799), Kant publicly dismisses Fichte’s project, refusing to characterise it as “critical.” What Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is missing, is precisely a foundation grounded (...)
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  3. La Chose En Soi Comme Concept "Critique" : Le Problème de la Limitation de la Connaissance Dans la Critique de la Raison Pure de Kant.Maria Hotes - 2014 - Dissertation, Université de Montréal
    In the following thesis, we will claim that Kant’s concept of a thing-in-itself is both a metaphysical and a critical concept. Accordingly, the thing-in-itself must be understood as a real transcendental object that grounds phenomena. Thus, we maintain – contrary to F.H. Jacobi’s and G.E. Schulze’s harsh objections – that this assertion does not violate the structures of critical philosophy. Indeed, this particular claim is arrived at through analogical cognition, which does not transgress the boundaries of human knowledge: as a (...)
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