Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons

Journal of Philosophy 118 (2):97-111 (2021)
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I argue that Davidson's conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts.
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First archival date: 2020-02-11
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