Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons

Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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I argue that Davidson's conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts.
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