Results for 'Ambidextrous Reasons'

979 found
Order:
  1. Ambidextrous Reasons (or Why Reasons First's Reasons Aren't Facts).Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (30):1-16.
    The wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem is a problem for attempts to analyze normative properties using only facts about the balance of normative reasons, a style of analysis on which the ‘Reasons First’ programme depends. I argue that this problem cannot be solved if the orthodox view of reasons is true --- that is, if each normative reason is numerically identical with some fact, proposition, or state-of-affairs. That’s because solving the WKR problem requires completely distinguishing between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  2. Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons.Nathan Howard - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (2):97-111.
    I argue that Davidson's conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  3. Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga.Kelly James Clark & Michael Reason Rea (eds.) - 2012 - , US: Oup Usa.
    In May 2010, philosophers, family and friends gathered at the University of Notre Dame to celebrate the career and retirement of Alvin Plantinga, widely recognized as one of the world's leading figures in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Plantinga has earned particular respect within the community of Christian philosophers for the pivotal role that he played in the recent renewal and development of philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Each of the essays in this volume engages with some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  4. The Double-Movement Model of Forgiveness in Buddhist and Christian Rituals.Paul Reasoner & Charles Taliaferro - 2009 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1):27 - 39.
    We offer a model of moral reform and regeneration that involves a wrong-doer making two movements: on the one hand, he identifies with himself as the one who did the act, while he also intentionally moves away from that self (or set of desires and intentions) and moves toward a transformed identity. We see this model at work in the formal practice of contrition and reform in Christian and Buddhist rites. This paper is part of a broader project we are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Eleonore Stump. Wandering in Darkenss: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering. Oxford University Press, 2010.Charles Taliaferro & Paul Reasoner - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):455--459.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. The right and the wrong kind of reasons.Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12412.
    In a number of recent philosophical debates, it has become common to distinguish between two kinds of normative reasons, often called the right kind of reasons (henceforth: RKR) and the wrong kind of reasons (henceforth: WKR). The distinction was first introduced in discussions of the so-called buck-passing account of value, which aims to analyze value properties in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes and has been argued to face the wrong kind of reasons problem. But nowadays (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  7. (1 other version)Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri, Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  8. What makes reasons sufficient?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):159-170.
    This paper addresses the question: ‘what makes reasons sufficient?’ and offers the answer, ‘being at least as weighty as the reasons for the alternatives’. The paper starts by introducing some of the reasons why sufficiency has seemed difficult to understand, particularly in epistemology, and some circumstantial evidence that this has contributed to more general problems in the epistemological literature. It then introduces the positive account of sufficiency, and explains how this captures sufficiency in both the practical and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  9. Recognizing Argument Types and Adding Missing Reasons.Christoph Lumer - 2019 - In Bart J. Garssen, David Godden, Gordon Mitchell & Jean Wagemans, Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). [Amsterdam, July 3-6, 2018.]. Sic Sat. pp. 769-777.
    The article develops and justifies, on the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory, two central pieces of the theory of evaluative argumentation interpretation: 1. criteria for recognizing argument types and 2. rules for adding reasons to create ideal arguments. Ad 1: The criteria for identifying argument types are a selection of essential elements from the definitions of the respective argument types. Ad 2: After presenting the general principles for adding reasons (benevolence, authenticity, immanence, optimization), heuristics are proposed for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10. Getting Perspective on Objective Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Ethics 128 (2):289-319.
    This article considers two important problems for the idea that what we ought to do is determined by the balance of competing reasons. The problems are distinct, but the object of the article is to explore how they admit of a single solution. It is a consequence of this solution that objective reasons—facts that count in favor—are in an important sense less objective than they have consistently been assumed to be. This raises but does not answer the question (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  11. Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action.Ruth Chang - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith, Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Clarendon Press. pp. 56--90.
    What sorts of consideration can be normative reasons for action? If we systematize the wide variety of considerations that can be cited as normative reasons, do we find that there is a single kind of consideration that can always be a reason? Desire-based theorists think that the fact that you want something or would want it under certain evaluatively neutral conditions can always be your normative reason for action. Value-based theorists, by contrast, think that what plays that role (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  12. Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.
    In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  13. Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2013 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (3):1-8.
    Mark Schroeder has recently offered a solution to the problem of distinguishing between the so-called " right " and " wrong " kinds of reasons for attitudes like belief and admiration. Schroeder tries out two different strategies for making his solution work: the alethic strategy and the background-facts strategy. In this paper I argue that neither of Schroeder's two strategies will do the trick. We are still left with the problem of distinguishing the right from the wrong kinds of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  14. Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Alex Gregory - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna, The Nature of Desire. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 201-217.
    This paper examines the view that desires are beliefs about normative reasons for action. It describes the view, and briefly sketches three arguments for it. But the focus of the paper is defending the view from objections. The paper argues that the view is consistent with the distinction between the direction of fit of beliefs and desires, that it is consistent with the existence of appetites such as hunger, that it can account for counterexamples that aim to show that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  15. Wittgenstein on the Chain of Reasons.Matthieu Queloz - 2016 - Wittgenstein-Studien 7 (1):105-130.
    In this paper, I examine Wittgenstein’s conception of reason and rationality through the lens of his conception of reasons. Central in this context, I argue, is the image of the chain, which informs not only his methodology in the form of the chain-method, but also his conception of reasons as linking up immediately, like the links of a chain. I first provide a general sketch of what reasons are on Wittgenstein’s view, arguing that giving reasons consists (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  16. How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--33.
    In this paper I propose a teleological account of epistemic reasons. In recent years, the main challenge for any such account has been to explicate a sense in which epistemic reasons depend on the value of epistemic properties. I argue that while epistemic reasons do not directly depend on the value of epistemic properties, they depend on a different class of reasons which are value based in a direct sense, namely reasons to form beliefs about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  17. Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action.David Sobel - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):218.
    These days, just about every philosophical debate seems to generate a position labeledinternalism. The debate I will be joining in this essay concerns reasons for action and their connection, or lack of connection, to motivation. The internalist position in this debate posits a certain essential connection between reasons and motivation, while the externalist position denies such a connection. This debate about internalism overlaps an older debate between Humeans and Kantians about the exclusive reason-giving power of desires. As we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  18. Understanding standing: permission to deflect reasons.Ori J. Herstein - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3109-3132.
    Standing is a peculiar norm, allowing for deflecting that is rejecting offhand and without deliberation interventions such as directives. Directives are speech acts that aim to give directive-reasons, which are reason to do as the directive directs because of the directive. Standing norms, therefore, provide for deflecting directives regardless of validity or the normative weight of the rejected directive. The logic of the normativity of standing is, therefore, not the logic of invalidating directives or of competing with directive-reasons (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  19. Pragmatic Encroachment and Practical Reasons.Anne Baril - 2018 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath, Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
    Defenders of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology hold that practical factors have implications for a belief’s epistemic status. Paradigm defenders of pragmatic encroachment have held—to state their positions roughly— that whether someone’s belief that p constitutes knowledge depends on the practical reasons that she has (Stanley 2005), that knowing p is necessary and sufficient for treating p as a reason for action (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008), or that knowing p is sufficient for reasonably acting as if p (Fantl and McGrath (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20. Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.
    In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when they are thinking, and no one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  21. (1 other version)Overcoming Deadlock: Scientific and Ethical Reasons to Accept the Extended Mind Thesis.Karina Vold - 2018 - Philosophy and Society 29 (4):489-504.
    The extended mind thesis maintains that while minds may be centrally located in one’s brain-and-body, they are sometimes partly constituted by tools in our environment. Critics argue that we have no reason to move from the claim that cognition is embedded in the environment to the stronger claim that cognition can be constituted by the environment. I will argue that there are normative reasons, both scientific and ethical, for preferring the extended account of the mind to the rival embedded (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  22. A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence.Guy Fletcher - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (3):417-420.
    Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star have recently proposed this thesis: [Reasons as Evidence: Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to PHI.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  23. Two Orders of Things: Wittgenstein on Reasons and Causes.Matthieu Queloz - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (3):369-97.
    This paper situates Wittgenstein in what is known as the causalism/anti-causalism debate in the philosophy of mind and action and reconstructs his arguments to the effect that reasons are not a species of causes. On the one hand, the paper aims to reinvigorate the question of what these arguments are by offering a historical sketch of the debate showing that Wittgenstein's arguments were overshadowed by those of the people he influenced, and that he came to be seen as an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  24. Humean agent-neutral reasons?Daan Evers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67.
    In his recent book Slaves of the Passions , Mark Schroeder defends a Humean account of practical reasons ( hypotheticalism ). He argues that it is compatible with 'genuinely agent-neutral reasons'. These are reasons that any agent whatsoever has. According to Schroeder, they may well include moral reasons. Furthermore, he proposes a novel account of a reason's weight, which is supposed to vindicate the claim that agent-neutral reasons ( if they exist), would be weighty irrespective (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  25. Moral realism, normative reasons, and rational intelligibility.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):47-69.
    This paper concerns a prima facie tension between the claims that (a) agents have normative reasons obtaining in virtue of the nature of the options that confront them, and (b) there is a non-trivial connection between the grounds of normative reasons and the upshots of sound practical reasoning. Joint commitment to these claims is shown to give rise to a dilemma. I argue that the dilemma is avoidable on a response dependent account of normative reasons accommodating both (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  26. Weighing and aggregating reasons under uncertainty: a trilemma.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2853-2871.
    I discuss the trilemma that consists of the following three principles being inconsistent: 1. The Common Principle: if one distribution, A, necessarily brings a higher total sum of personal value that is distributed in a more egalitarian way than another distribution, B, A is more valuable than B. 2. (Weak) ex-ante Pareto: if one uncertain distribution, A, is more valuable than another uncertain distribution, B, for each patient, A is more valuable than B. 3. Pluralism about attitudes to risk (Pluralism): (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  27. An Adam Smithian account of moral reasons.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):1073-1087.
    The Humean Theory of Reasons, according to which all of our reasons for action are explained by our desires, has been criticized for not being able to account for “moral reasons,” namely, overriding reasons to act on moral demands regardless of one's desires. My aim in this paper is to utilize ideas from Adam Smith's moral philosophy in order to offer a novel and alternative account of moral reasons that is both desire-based and accommodating of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  28. Bearing the Weight of Reasons.Stephen Kearns - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire, Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 173-190.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  29. Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?Daniel Wodak - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):259-279.
    I argue that existing objectivist accounts of subjective reasons face systematic problems with cases involving probability and possibility. I then offer a diagnosis of why objectivists face these problems, and recommend that objectivists seek to provide indirect analyses of subjective reasons.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  30. Subjective and Objective Reasons.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - In Daniel Star, The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  31. Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):607-633.
    In his important recent book Schroeder proposes a Humean theory of reasons that he calls hypotheticalism. His rigourous account of the weight of reasons is crucial to his theory, both as an element of the theory and constituting his defence to powerful standard objections to Humean theories of reasons. In this paper I examine that rigourous account and show it to face problems of vacuity and consonance. There are technical resources that may be brought to bear on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  32. The doctrine of internal reasons.H. Lillehammer - 2000 - Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4):507-516.
    According to advocates of internalism about reasons for action, there is an interesting connection between an agent’s reasons and the agent’s present desires. On the simplest version of this view, an agent has a reason to act a certain way at some time if and only if acting that way would promote his present desires. Let us call this the sub-Humean model.1 The sub-Humean model is widely regarded as too simple on the grounds that there are adverse conditions, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  33. Respect and the reality of apparent reasons.Kurt Sylvan - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3129-3156.
    Rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mistakes of rationality are necessarily real mistakes? This paper gives a novel answer to these questions. I argue first that in the moral domain, there are objective duties of respect that we violate whenever we do what appears to violate our first-order duties. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  34. Opposing Laws with Religious Reasons.Henrik D. Kugelberg - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 52 (1):132-151.
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  35. Contextualism about Epistemic Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Kurt Sylvan - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Is Perception a Source of Reasons?Santiago Echeverri - 2012 - Theoria 79 (1):22-56.
    It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some ways of developing this view and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  37. Are there any nonmotivating reasons for action?Noa Latham - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann, Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic. pp. 273.
    When performing an action of a certain kind, an agent typically has se- veral reasons for doing so. I shall borrow Davidson’s term and call these rationalising reasons (Davidson 1963, 3). These are reasons that allow us to understand what the agent regarded as favourable features of such an action. (There will also be reasons against acting, expressing unfavour- able features of such an action, from the agent’s point of view.) I shall say that R is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  38. Trust and belief: a preemptive reasons account.Arnon Keren - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2593-2615.
    According to doxastic accounts of trust, trusting a person to \(\varPhi \) involves, among other things, holding a belief about the trusted person: either the belief that the trusted person is trustworthy or the belief that she actually will \(\varPhi \) . In recent years, several philosophers have argued against doxastic accounts of trust. They have claimed that the phenomenology of trust suggests that rather than such a belief, trust involves some kind of non-doxastic mental attitude towards the trusted person, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  39. Internalism, (Super)fragile Reasons, and the Conditional Fallacy.Teresa Robertson - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (2):171-184.
    Abstract David Sobel (2001) objects to Bernard Williams's internalism, the view that an agent has a reason to perform an action only if she has some motive that will be served by performing that action. Sobel is an unusual challenger in that he endorses neo-Humean subjectivism, ?the view that it is the agent's subjective motivational set that makes it the case that an agent does or does not have a reason to φ? (219). Sobel's objection in fact arises from this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  40. Too far beyond the call of duty: moral rationalism and weighing reasons.Chris Tucker - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):2029-2052.
    The standard account of supererogation holds that Liv is not morally required to jump on a grenade, thereby sacrificing her life, to save the lives of five soldiers. Many proponents defend the standard account by appealing to moral rationalism about requirement. These same proponents hold that Bernie is morally permitted to jump on a grenade, thereby sacrificing his life, to spare someone a mild burn. I argue that this position is unstable, at least as moral rationalism is ordinarily defended. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41. Incoherence and the balance of evidential reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-10.
    Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt’s cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  42. Particularism and moral theory: Particularism and presumptive reasons: Garrett Cullity.Garrett Cullity - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):169–190.
    Weak particularism about reasons is the view that the normative valency of some descriptive considerations varies, while others have an invariant normative valency. A defence of this view needs to respond to arguments that a consideration cannot count in favour of any action unless it counts in favour of every action. But it cannot resort to a global holism about reasons, if it claims that there are some examples of invariant valency. This paper argues for weak particularism, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  43. How Far Can Genealogies Affect the Space of Reasons? Vindication, Justification and Excuses.Francesco Testini - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Pragmatic vindicatory genealogies provide both a cause and a rationale and can thus affect the space of reasons. But how far is the space of reasons affected by this kind of genealogical argument? What normative and evaluative implications do these arguments have? In this paper, I unpack this issue into three different sub-questions and explain what kinds of reasons they provide, for whom are these reasons, and for what. In relation to this final sub-question I argue, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44. Two Senses of "Why": Traits and Reasons in the Explanation of Action.Iskra Fileva - 2016 - In Questions of Character. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 182-202.
    I discuss the respective roles of traits and reasons in the explanation of action. I begin by noting that traits and reasons explanations are systematically connected: traits explanations require motivation by reasons. Actions due to psychiatric conditions such as mental disorders cannot be explained by an appeal to traits. Because traits require motivation by reasons, it is often possible to explain one and the same action by an appeal to either the agent's traits or to her (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  45. The Value-Free Ideal of Science: A Useful Fiction? A Review of Non-epistemic Reasons for the Research Integrity Community.Jacopo Ambrosj, Kris Dierickx & Hugh Desmond - 2023 - Science and Engineering Ethics 29 (1):1-22.
    Even if the “value-free ideal of science” (VFI) were an unattainable goal, one could ask: can it be a useful fiction, one that is beneficial for the research community and society? This question is particularly crucial for scholars and institutions concerned with research integrity (RI), as one cannot offer normative guidance to researchers without making some assumptions about what ideal scientific research looks like. Despite the insofar little interaction between scholars studying RI and those working on values in science, the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons.Fabian Dorsch - 2018 - In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch, Phenomenal Presence. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons – the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs – is incompatible with the following triad of claims: -/- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason. -/- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated. -/- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  47. Strategic collective action and the proportionality of reasons to expected benefits.Howard Leo Nye, Madeline Youngman & Avontay Williams - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-32.
    We argue that, in order to explain the relative strengths of our reasons to contribute to different collective endeavours, approaches to the ethics of collective action must understand the strengths of our reasons to make a given contribution as proportional to its expected benefits, or its chances of bringing about benefits in proportion to their magnitudes. The view that most clearly meets this proportionality requirement is the expected consequences approach, which identifies our reasons to perform an act (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.
    Philosophers have come to distinguish between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reasons for belief, intention, and other attitudes. Several theories about the nature of this distinction have been offered, by far the most prevalent of which is the idea that it is, at bottom, the distinction between what are known as ‘object-given’ and ‘state-given’ reasons. This paper argues that the object-given/state-given theory vastly overgeneralizes on a small set of data points, and in particular that any adequate account of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   142 citations  
  49. Hume and the Unity of Reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2024 - In Scott Stapleford & Verena Wagner, Hume and contemporary epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Current debates about reasons and reasoning often draw comparisons between epistemic and practical reasons and reasoning and presuppose substantial unity between the practical and epistemic domains. This stance seems to conflict with a stark Humean contrast between the two domains: With respect to practical reasons and reasoning, Hume highlights the role of impressions, especially the passions, in motivating and rationalizing action, while apparently downplaying the potential relevance of beliefs, reason, or reasons. With respect to epistemic (...) and theoretical reasoning, he urges us to proportion our belief to the evidence (EHU 10.4), which suggests a significant epistemic role for evidential reasons. My contribution ar-gues that there is nonetheless a convincing and interesting unified Humean account of reasons and reasoning across both domains. To present my case, I first narrow down the unity claim that I am interested in. I then closely engage with Hume’s claims in epistemology, the philos-ophy of action, and metaethics to develop the unified Humean account. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. The Unity of Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - In Daniel Star, The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 46-66.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 979