Kant on Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge

In The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 201-222 (2016)
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Abstract

The paper addresses an exegetical puzzle that is raised by Kant's distinction between opining (Meinen), believing (Glauben), and knowing (Wissen). In presenting his moral arguments, Kant often points out that belief, as he conceives of it, has a unique feature: it requires non-epistemic justification. Yet Kant's official formulation of the tripartite distinction runs counter to this claim. It describes Belief in terms of a set of two features, each of which also pertains to either opinion or knowledge. My aim in this paper is to propose a novel interpretation of Kant’s distinction which dissolves this exegetical puzzle.

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Thomas Höwing
Goethe University Frankfurt

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