Two Notions of Logical Form

Journal of Philosophy 113 (12):617-643 (2016)
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Abstract
This paper claims that there is no such thing as the correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and semantics. The first part of the paper outlines the thesis that a unique notion of logical form fulfils both roles, and argues that the alleged best candidate for making it true is unsuited for one of the two roles. The second part spells out a considerably different notion which is free from that problem, although it does not fit the other role. As it will be suggested, each of the two notions suits at most one role, so the uniqueness thesis is ungrounded
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
IACTNO
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First archival date: 2016-01-26
Latest version: 2 (2016-06-20)
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2016-01-26

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