Belief, rationality, and psychophysical laws

In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 47-54 (2000)
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Abstract

This paper argues that Davidson's claim that the connection between belief and the "constitutive ideal of rationality" precludes the possibility of any type-type identities between mental and physical events relies on blurring the distinction between two ways of understanding this "constitutive ideal", and that no consistent understanding the constitutive ideal allows it to play the dialectical role Davidson intends for it

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Henry Jackman
York University

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