What’s Epistemic About Epistemic Paternalism?

In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. New York: Routledge. pp. 132–150 (2022)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to (i) examine the concept of epistemic paternalism and (ii) explore the consequences of normative questions one might ask about it. I begin by critically examining several definitions of epistemic paternalism that have been proposed, and suggesting ways they might be improved. I then contrast epistemic and general paternalism and argue that it’s difficult to see what makes epistemic paternalism an epistemic phenomenon at all. Next, I turn to the various normative questions one might ask about epistemic paternalism and discuss the literature’s assumptions of epistemic consequentialism and veritism. I close by comparing and contrasting epistemic paternalism with other topics in social epistemology, such as disagreement or testimony.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
JACWEA
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-04-16
Latest version: 3 (2021-05-31)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-04-16

Total views
394 ( #17,594 of 65,606 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
126 ( #4,757 of 65,606 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.