The Problem with Truthmaker-Gap Epistemicism

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):320-329 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Epistemicism about vagueness is the view that vagueness, or indeterminacy, is an epistemic matter. Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is the view that indeterminate truths are indeterminate because their truth is not grounded by any worldly fact. Both epistemicism in general and truthmaker-gap epistemicism originated in Roy Sorensen's work on vagueness. My aim in this paper is to give a characterization of truthmaker-gap epistemicism and argue that the view is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: vagueness in whether some case of the form ‘it is determinate that A’ or ‘it is indeterminate whether A’ is true. Since it is highly likely that there is higher-order vagueness, truthmaker-gap epistemicism is in an uncomfortable position
PhilPapers/Archive ID
JAGTPW
Upload history
Archival date: 2013-03-28
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-03-28

Total views
957 ( #6,484 of 72,527 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
64 ( #11,973 of 72,527 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.