Evaluative Disagreements
Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (1):67-87 (2016)
Abstract
A recent quarrel over faultless disagreements assumes that disputes over evaluative
sentences should be understood as regular, factual disagreements. Instead, I propose that evaluative disagreements should be understood in Lewisian terms. Language use works like a rule-governed game. In it, the assertion of an evaluative sentence is an attempt to establish one value as default in the conversation; its rejection, in turn, is in most cases the refusal to accept this move.
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2017-04-06
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9 ( #49,161 of 55,858 )
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