Dissertation, (
2016)
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Abstract
This paper analyses the phenomenon of strange, rigid beliefs through the lens of predictive processing (PP). By “strange, rigid beliefs” I refer to abstract beliefs about the world for which, according to a rational and scientific worldview, there is no evidence available, yet which people struggle to abandon even when challenged with strong counterarguments or counterevidence.
Following recent PP accounts of delusion formation, I show that one explanation for such strangely persistent beliefs can be a breakdown of the predictive machinery itself. However, given how common strange, rigid beliefs are, I argue that there must be another kind of explanation too – one that does not presuppose a malfunction of the prediction engine.
This will lead me to develop an alternative account that I will call “hijacking beliefs”. Using the example of supernatural beliefs, I will argue that certain abstract beliefs, when adopted under the right circumstances, are especially hard to dislodge for a predictive mind, as they are evidentially self-protective. Such beliefs may be consistent with a wide range of experiences and therefore hard to falsify, and might also bias future perception, action, and model-updating in ways that make them immune to rational revision.