Abstract

The question “What is it to be an artifact?” must be distinguished from the question “What is it to be an artifact of kind K?”. Failure to distinguish between these two questions leads to an exaggeration of the role of intentions in the philosophy of artifacts. We accept that intentions are necessary to define the category of artifacts, but we reject the view that intentions are constitutive of what makes something a specific kind of artifact. In the first part of this paper, we discuss a series of cases involving what we call “faith-based artifacts” which often exhibit a social dimension. These cases, we argue, constitute counterexamples to the thesis that something is an artifact of a specific kind if it was produced with the intention that it be an object of that kind. In the second part of the paper, we explain how a capacity-based approach to artifacts, by contrast, can accommodate faith-based artifacts. In the last section, we address an objection to the capacity-based approach.