Commitment Beyond Justification

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Should our degree of commitment to a value, relationship, or goal be proportional to the degree of justification that we take the commitment to possess? Or are there reasons for maintaining wholehearted commitments even in cases where we have relatively weak justifications for those commitments? I argue in favor of the latter position: degree of commitment should sometimes diverge from degree of justification. To make this case, I introduce and critique what I call Locke’s Dictum: the claim that our degree of our commitment to an evaluative claim should match the degree of justification for it (decisive justification warrants full commitment, whereas weaker justification warrants weaker commitment). While it has initial appeal, I argue that Locke’s Dictum is mistaken. I argue that many important goals, values, and relationships require wholehearted commitment to evaluative propositions in the absence of decisive justification for them. So we are faced with a choice: either we violate Locke’s Dictum; or we forgo the goods internal to full-fledged commitments; or we deny a reasonable pluralism about possible commitments. I argue that we must reject Locke’s Dictum and with it a series of seeming platitudes about the connection between justificatory reflection, commitment, and fanaticism or extremism. ​

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Paul Katsafanas
Boston University

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