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  1. Evidence and Epistemic Normativity.Daniel Buckley - 2022 - Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington
    Evidence is often taken to be “normative” for doxastic agents. For instance, we are told to apportion our beliefs to the evidence, to not believe a claim without seeking out countervailing evidence, and so on. But what accounts for the normativity of evidence? This dissertation is devoted to answering this question. In order to answer it, I develop a novel approach to the theory of epistemic normativity. According to my approach, epistemic norms structure a social practice of epistemic accountability. This (...)
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  2. Evidence, Reasons, and Knowledge in the Reasons-First Program.Paul Silva & Sven Bernecker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First is admirable in its scope and execution, deftly demonstrating the theoretical promise of extending the reasons-first approach from ethics to epistemology. In what follows we explore how (not) to account for the evidence-that relation within the reasons-first program owing to self-fulfilling and self-defeating beliefs, we explain how factive content views of evidence can be resilient in the face of Schroeder’s criticisms, and we explain how knowledge from falsehood threatens Schroeder’s view of knowledge. Along the way we (...)
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  3. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Political Normativity.Adrian Kreutz & Enzo Rossi - forthcoming - Political Studies Review.
    Do salient normative claims about politics require moral premises? Political moralists think they do, political realists think they do not. We defend the viability of realism in a two-pronged way. First, we show that a number of recent attacks on realism, as well as realist responses to those attacks, unduly conflate distinctively political normativity and non-moral political normativity. Second, we argue that Alex Worsnip and Jonathan Leader-Maynard’s recent attack on realist arguments for a distinctively political normativity depends on assuming moralism (...)
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  4. The Division of Normativity and a Defence of Demanding Moral Theories.Elizabeth Ventham - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
    Morality, according to some theories, demands a lot of us. One way to defend such demanding moral theories is through an appeal to the division of normativity; on this picture, morality is only one of the normative domains that guides us, so it should be expected that we often fail to follow that guidance. This paper defends the division of normativity as a response to demandingness objections against an alternative: moral rationalism. It does this by addressing and refuting three arguments: (...)
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  5. Kantian Constructivism and the Sources of Normativity.Janis David Schaab - 2022 - Kant Yearbook 14 (1):97-120.
    While it is uncontroversial that Kantian constructivism has implications for normative ethics, its status as a metaethical view has been contested. In this article, I provide a characterisation of metaethical Kantian constructivism that withstands these criticisms. I start by offering a partial defence of Sharon Street’s practical standpoint characterisation. However, I argue that this characterisation, as presented by Street, is ultimately incomplete because it fails to demonstrate that the claims of Kantian constructivism constitute a distinctive contribution to metaethics. I then (...)
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  6. The Normativity of Group Agents [Preprint].Jimmy Lewis-Martin - manuscript
    Group agents like businesses, political parties, universities, and charity organisations dominate our social and political landscapes. Their activities dictate our legal structures, the availability of education and healthcare, and our collective leap into climate crisis. Hence, it is crucial that we understand both the norms of these group agents and how these norms arise. will argue for applying the organisational account of normativity to group agents as the best means to achieve this understanding. Roughly, the organisational account says that the (...)
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  7. Alienation and the Metaphysics of Normativity: On the Quality of Our Relations with the World.Jack Samuel - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    I argue that metaethicists should be concerned with two kinds of alienation that can result from theories of normativity: alienation between an agent and her reasons, and alienation between an agent and the concrete others with whom morality is principally concerned. A theory that cannot avoid alienation risks failing to make sense of central features of our experience of being agents, in whose lives normativity plays an important role. The twin threats of alienation establish two desiderata for theories of normativity; (...)
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  8. Mechanizmy predykcyjne i ich normatywność [Predictive mechanisms and their normativity].Michał Piekarski - 2020 - Warszawa, Polska: Liberi Libri.
    The aim of this study is to justify the belief that there are biological normative mechanisms that fulfill non-trivial causal roles in the explanations (as formulated by researchers) of actions and behaviors present in specific systems. One example of such mechanisms is the predictive mechanisms described and explained by predictive processing (hereinafter PP), which (1) guide actions and (2) shape causal transitions between states that have specific content and fulfillment conditions (e.g. mental states). Therefore, I am guided by a specific (...)
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  9. What is Distinctive of Political Normativity? From Domain View to Role View.Erman Eva - forthcoming - Philosophy and Social Criticism.
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  10. Demystifying Normativity: Morality, Error Theory, and the Authority of Norms.Eline Gerritsen - 2022 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews, University of Stirling & University of Groningen
    We are subject to many different norms telling us how to act, from moral norms to etiquette rules and the law. While some norms may simply be ignored, we live under the impression that others matter for what we ought to do. How can we make sense of this normative authority some norms have? Does it fit into our naturalist worldview? Many philosophers claim it does not. Normativity is conceived to be distinct from ordinary natural properties, making it mysterious. The (...)
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  11. Epistemic Normativity is Not Independent of Our Goals.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd Edition. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  12. Basic Knowledge and the Normativity of Knowledge: The Awareness‐First Solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.
    Many have found it plausible that knowledge is a constitutively normative state, i.e. a state that is grounded in the possession of reasons. Many have also found it plausible that certain cases of proprioceptive knowledge, memorial knowledge, and self-evident knowledge are cases of knowledge that are not grounded in the possession of reasons. I refer to these as cases of basic knowledge. The existence of basic knowledge forms a primary objection to the idea that knowledge is a constitutively normative state. (...)
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  13. Black Trust in Covid-19 Vaccine Efficacy: An Application of Kauppinen’s Epistemic Normativity.Maddox Larson - manuscript
    In recent American politics, there has become a larger atmosphere of distrust regarding the pre-existing representative democratic system as well as the criminal justice system. This topic has quickly come more and more into focus following the 2016 Presidential Election and then throughout the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and civil unrest. However, America is not the only country that is challenging the preexisting systems, there are many countries (e.g., Canada, UK, Australia, etc.) who have recently seen opposition to government action. Throughout (...)
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  14. Black Trust in Covid-19 Vaccine Efficacy: An Application of Kauppinen’s Epistemic Normativity.Maddox Larson - manuscript
    In recent American politics, there has become a larger atmosphere of distrust regarding the pre-existing representative democratic system as well as the criminal justice system. This topic has quickly come more and more into focus following the 2016 Presidential Election and then throughout the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and civil unrest. However, America is not the only country that is challenging the preexisting systems, there are many countries (e.g., Canada, UK, Australia, etc.) who have recently seen opposition to government action. Throughout (...)
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  15. Controlling Our Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Noûs.
    Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingly good reason. We cannot choose to act for a reason and acting-for-a-reason is not itself something we do. While some have challenged this in the case of reasons for action, these claims (...)
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  16. Epistemic Normativity is Independent of Our Goals.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Blake Roeber, Matthias Steup, Ernest Sosa & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (3rd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell.
    In epistemology and in ordinary life, we make many normative claims about beliefs. As with all normative claims, philosophical questions arise about what – if anything – underwrites these kinds of normative claims. On one view, epistemic instrumentalism, facts about what we (epistemically) ought to believe, or about what is an (epistemic, normative) reason to believe what, obtain at least partly in virtue of our goals (or aims, ends, intentions, desires, etc.). The converse view, anti-instrumentalism, denies this, and holds that (...)
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  17. What Is Evaluable for Fit?Oded Na'aman - forthcoming - In Christopher Howard & Richard Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. Oxford University Press.
    Our beliefs, intentions, desires, regrets, and fears are evaluable for fit—they can succeed or fail to be fitting responses to the objects they are about. Can our headaches and heartrates be evaluable for fit? The common view says ‘no’. This chapter argues: sometimes, yes. First, it claims that when a racing heart accompanies fear it seems to have the typical characteristics of fit-evaluable items. Then, it suggests that suspicion of this initial impression is explained by the assumption that whether an (...)
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  18. A Review of Data-Intensive Approaches for Sustainability: Methodology, Epistemology, Normativity, and Ontology.Vivek Anand Asokan - 2020 - Sustainability Science 15.
    With the growth of data, data-intensive approaches for sustainability are becoming widespread and have been endorsed by various stakeholders. To understand their implications, in this paper data-intensive approaches for sustainability will be explored by conducting an extensive review. The current data-intensive approaches are defined as an amalgamation of traditional data-collection methods, like surveys and data from monitoring networks, with new data-collection methods that involve new information communication technology. Based on a comprehensive review of the current dataintensive approaches for sustainability, key (...)
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  19. Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland - forthcoming - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. Oxford University Press.
    The chapter introduces and characterizes the notion of fittingness. It charts the history of the relation and its relevance to contemporary debates in normative and metanormative philosophy and proceeds to survey issues to do with fittingness covered in the volume’s chapters, including the nature and epistemology of fittingness, the relations between fittingness and reasons, the normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness in theorizing about responsibility. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of issues to (...)
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  20. The Authoritative Normativity of Fitting Attitudes.R. A. Rowland - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:108-137.
    Some standards, such as moral and prudential standards, provide genuinely or authoritatively normative reasons for action. Other standards, such as the norms of masculinity and the mafia’s code of omerta, provide reasons but do not provide genuinely normative reasons for action. This paper first explains that there is a similar distinction amongst attitudinal standards: some attitudes (belief, desire) have standards that seem to give rise to genuine normativity; others (boredom, envy) do not. This paper gives a value-based account of which (...)
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  21. Kant’s Account of Epistemic Normativity.Reza Hadisi - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    According to a common interpretation, most explicitly defended by Onora O’Neill and Patricia Kitcher, Kant held that epistemic obligations normatively depend on moral obligations. That is, were a rational agent not bound by any moral obligation, then she would not be bound by any epistemic obligation either. By contrast, in this paper, I argue that, according to Kant, some epistemic obligations are normatively independent from moral obligations, and are indeed normatively absolute. This view, which I call epistemicism, has two parts. (...)
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  22. In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity.David Horst - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):232-258.
    Epistemic constitutivism (EC) holds that the nature of believing is such that it gives rise to a standard of correctness and that other epistemic normative notions (e.g., reasons for belief) can be explained in terms of this standard. If defensible, this view promises an attractive and unifying account of epistemic normativity. However, EC faces a forceful objection: that constitutive standards of correctness are never enough for generating normative reasons. This paper aims to defend EC in the face of this objection. (...)
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  23. Exhaustiveness, Normativity, and Communicative Responsibilities.Miklós Márton & Tibor Bárány - 2022 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk & Martin Hinton (ed.), Philosophical Approaches to Language and Communication Vol. 2. Berlin, Németország: pp. 291-312.
    In this paper we analyze and discuss Jennifer Saul’s account of the famous Gricean notions of ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ and the alleged conflict between them and the so- called Speaker- Meaning Exhaustiveness Thesis (SMET), which is standardly attributed to Grice in the literature. SMET declares that speaker- meaning divides exhaustively into what is said and what is (conventionally or nonconventionally) implicated by the speaker. After a detailed interpretation of Saul’s position, we argue that her analysis partly (...)
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  24. Normativity at the Edge of Reason - Review of Cecile Malaspina, An Epistemology of Noise. [REVIEW]Iain Campbell - 2021 - Radical Philosophy 9:93-96.
    In recent years noise seems to have become an interdisciplinary concept par excellence, apt to capturing important dynamics at work whether in technological, scientific, social, or aesthetic domains. But when economists, biologists, psychologists, and musicians speak of noise, are they really all referring to the same thing? In An Epistemology of Noise Cecile Malaspina takes this dispersion of the notion of noise as a starting point, and moreover accepts that, when removed from its mathematical formulation in information theory and spread (...)
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  25. Absence and Abnormality.Bram Vaassen - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Absences pose a dilemma for theories of causation. Allowing them to be causes seems to make theories too permissive (Lewis, 2000). Banning them from being causes seems to make theories too restrictive (Schaffer, 2000, 2004). An increasingly popular approach to this dilemma is to acknowledge that norms can affect which absences count as causes (e.g., Thomson, 2003; McGrath, 2005; Henne et al., 2017; Willemsen, 2018). In this article, I distinguish between two influential implementations of such ‘abnormality’ approaches and argue that (...)
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  26. Towards a Unified Theory of Illocutionary Normativity.Neri Marsili - forthcoming - In Laura Caponetto & Paolo Labinaz (eds.), Sbisà on Speech as Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This chapter offers some programmatic suggestions for developing a unified framework for classifying, studying, and conceptualising illocutionary rules. It shows that Sbisà’s seminal work provides a fertile ground for bringing together under a single flag different lines of research on illocutionary normativity. It argues that the notions of illocutionary goals and illocutionary obligations can enrich Sbisà’s model. Finally, it develops an approach for deriving cooperative rules from an illocution's aims, delineating a way to model illocutionary normativity that avoids dubious appeals (...)
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  27. A Rossian Account of the Normativity of Logic.R. M. Farley & Deke Caiñas Gould - 2022 - Southwest Philosophy Review 38 (1):103-113.
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  28. Determinism, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Moral Obligation.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (1):35-62..
    Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via a threat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Haji’s argument requires not only that we embrace an ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle, but also that we adopt the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’. I argue that we have little reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deontic morality might be destroyed on the basis of the more commonly embraced ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (...)
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  29. A Multidimensional View of Misrecognition.Douglas Giles - 2018 - Ethics, Politics and Society 1 (1):9-38.
    Following Axel Honneth, I accept that recognition is integral to individuals’ self-realization and to social justice and that instances of misrecognition are injustices that cause moral injuries. The change in approach to misrecognition that I advocate is to replace a macrosocial top-down picture of misrecognition, such as Honneth’s typology, with a fine-grained phenomenological picture of multiple dimensions in misrecognition behaviors that offers greater explanatory power. This paper explains why a multidimensional view of misrecognition is needed and explores the various ways (...)
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  30. Kant, Frege, and the Normativity of Logic: MacFarlane 's Argument for Common Ground.Tyke Nunez - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):988-1009.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 988-1009, December 2021.
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  31. Rationality and Normativity.John Brunero - forthcoming - In International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
    This entry considers the question of whether rationality is normative; that is, the question of whether one always ought (or, more weakly, has a reason) to be rational. It first distinguishes substantive from structural rationality, noting how structural rationality presents a more serious challenge to the thesis that rationality is normative. It then considers the plausibility of skepticism about structural rationality, and notes some problems facing such skepticism. However, if we are not skeptics about structural requirements, we face the task (...)
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  32. Pluralism and Normativity in Truth and Logic.Gila Sher - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):337-350.
    In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and Restall (...)
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  33. Reasons, Normativity, and Value in Aesthetics.Alex King - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (1):1-17.
    Discussions of aesthetic reasons and normativity are becoming increasingly popular. This piece outlines six basic questions about aesthetic reasons, normativity, and value and discusses the space of possible answers to these questions. I divide the terrain into two groups of three questions each. First are questions about the shape of aesthetic reasons: what they favour, how strong they are, and where they come from. Second are relational questions about how aesthetic reasons fit into the wider normative landscape: whether they are (...)
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Normativity and Naturalism
  1. My Life Gives the Moral Landscape its Relief.Marc Champagne - 2023 - In Sam Harris: Critical Responses. Carus Books. pp. 17–38.
    Sam Harris (2010) argues that, given our neurology, we can experience well-being, and that seeking to maximize this state lets us distinguish the good from the bad. He takes our ability to compare degrees of well-being as his starting point, but I think that the analysis can be pushed further, since there is a (non-religious) reason why well-being is desirable, namely the finite life of an individual organism. It is because death is a constant possibility that things can be assessed (...)
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  2. Traditional Epistemology and Epistemology Naturalized.Matt Carlson - 2021 - Logique Et Analyse 1 (456):449-466.
    In this paper, I develop a new interpretation of Quine’s epistemology in the hopes of clarifying the relationship between naturalized epistemology and traditional epistemology. Quine’s naturalized epistemology is commonly criticized on the grounds that it amounts to giving up on traditional epistemological projects in favor of projects in natural science. But, I argue, this criticism rests on a mistaken interpretation of Quine’s epistemology. This is because Quine’s naturalized epistemology retains an important meliorative component; part of its aim is to improve (...)
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  3. Corijn van Mazijk: Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell, New York: Routledge, 2020, 192 Pp., ISBN 978-0-367-44180-7, ISBN 978-1-003-01022-7. [REVIEW]Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Continental Philosophy Review 55 (1):119-123.
    Corijn van Mazijk’s book is a critical exploration of the relations between Immanuel Kant’s, Edmund Husserl’s, and John McDowell’s transcendental philosophies. His primary aim is not to conduct a historical study, but “to show that history provides us with viable alternatives to McDowell’s theory of our perceptual access to reality.” The book covers a variety of McDowellian themes: the Myth of the Given, the space of reasons vs. the space of nature, conceptualism, disjunctivism, naturalism, and realism—uncovering the roots of McDowell’s (...)
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  4. The Identity of the Self Over Time is Normative.David L. Thompson - manuscript
    The temporal unity of the self cannot be accounted for by the continuity of causal, factual, or contiguous relations between independently definable mental events, as proposed by Locke and Parfit. The identity of the self over time is normative: it depends on the institutional context of social rules external to the self that determine the relationship between past commitments and current responsibilities. (2005).
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  5. Artifactual Normativity.Christopher Frugé - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.
    A central tension shaping metaethical inquiry is that normativity appears to be subjective yet real, where it’s difficult to reconcile these aspects. On the one hand, normativity pertains to our actions and attitudes. On the other, normativity appears to be real in a way that precludes it from being a mere figment of those actions and attitudes. In this paper, I argue that normativity is indeed both subjective and real. I do so by way of treating it as a special (...)
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  6. Realism, Naturalism, and Hazlett’s Challenge Concerning Epistemic Value.Timothy Perrine - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-19.
    According to Realism about Epistemic Value, there is such a thing as epistemic value and it is appropriate to evaluate things—e.g., beliefs—for epistemic value because there is such a thing as epistemic value. Allan Hazlett's A Luxury of the Understanding is a sustained critique of Realism. Hazlett challenges proponent of Realism to answer explanatory questions while not justifiably violating certain constraints, including two proposed naturalistic constraints. Hazlett argues they cannot. Here I defend Realism. I argue that it is easy for (...)
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  7. “In a Certain Sense We Cannot Make Mistakes in Logic”: Wittgenstein’s Anti-Psychologism and the Normativity of Logic.Gilad Nir - 2021 - Disputatio 10 (18):165-185.
    Wittgenstein’s Tractatus construes the nature of reasoning in a manner which sharply conflicts with the conventional wisdom that logic is normative, not descriptive of thought. For although we sometimes seem to reason incorrectly, Wittgenstein denies that we can make logical mistakes (5.473). My aim in this paper is to show that the Tractatus provides us with good reasons to rethink some of the central assumptions that are standardly made in thinking about the relation between logic and thought. In particular, the (...)
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  8. Wherein is the Concept of Disease Normative? From Weak Normativity to Value-Conscious Naturalism.M. Cristina Amoretti & Elisabetta Lalumera - 2021 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 25 (1):1-14.
    In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity are different to the point that one ‘normativist’ label (...)
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  9. A Platonic Kind-Based Account of Goodness.Berman Chan - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1369-1389.
    Robert Adams defends a platonic account of goodness, understood as excellence, claiming that there exists a platonic good that all other good things must resemble, identifying the Good with God. Mark Murphy agrees, but argues that this platonic account is in need of Aristotelian supplementation, as resemblance must take into account a thing’s kind-membership. While this article will accept something like Murphy’s account of goodness, it will further develop its details and support. Without relying on theistic premises, I show that (...)
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  10. The Normative and the Natural.Michael Padraic Wolf & Jeremy Randel Koons - 2016 - New York: Palgrave.
    Drawing on a rich pragmatist tradition, this book offers an account of the different kinds of ‘oughts’, or varieties of normativity, that we are subject to contends that there is no conflict between normativity and the world as science describes it. The authors argue that normative claims aim to evaluate, to urge us to do or not do something, and to tell us how a state of affairs ought to be. These claims articulate forms of action-guidance that are different in (...)
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  11. Neuroscience and Normativity: How Knowledge of the Brain Offers a Deeper Understanding of Moral and Legal Responsibility.William Hirstein - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):327-351.
    Neuroscience can relate to ethics and normative issues via the brain’s cognitive control network. This network accomplishes several executive processes, such as planning, task-switching, monitoring, and inhibiting. These processes allow us to increase the accuracy of our perceptions and our memory recall. They also allow us to plan much farther into the future, and with much more detail than any of our fellow mammals. These abilities also make us fitting subjects for responsibility claims. Their activity, or lack thereof, is at (...)
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  12. An Ebola-Like Microbe and The Limits of Kind-Based Goodness.Berman Chan - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (2):451-471.
    Aristotelian theory, as found in Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot, claims that to be good is to be good as a member of that kind, and so there are varying standards of goodness dependent on an individual’s kind-membership. It is a perhaps little noticed feature of Foot’s project, in particular, that it aims to provide more than just a kind-relative account, but seeks an exhaustive account of goodness. She concludes, in effect, that goodness admits of only the kind-based sort. Accordingly, (...)
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  13. Normativity, Necessity and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5. Oxford University Press.
    Normative concepts have a special taste, which many consider to be proof that they cannot be reductively analyzed into entirely nonnormative components. This paper demonstrates that at least some intuitively normative concepts can be reductively analyzed. I focus on so-called ‘hypothetical imperatives’ or ‘anankastic conditionals’, and show that the availability of normative readings of conditionals is determined by features of grammar, specifically features of tense. Properly interpreted, these grammatical features suggest that these deontic modals are analyzable in terms of conditional (...)
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  14. On the Possibility of Wholesale Moral Error.Farbod Akhlaghi - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):236-247.
    The moral error theory, it seems, could be true. The mere possibility of its truth might also seem inconsequential. But it is not. For, I argue, there is a sense in which the moral error theory is possible that generates an argument against both non‐cognitivism and moral naturalism. I argue that it is an epistemic possibility that morality is subject to some form of wholesale error of the kind that would make the moral error theory true. Denying this possibility has (...)
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  15. Philosophy of Psychiatry.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2021 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Jonathan Y. Tsou examines and defends positions on central issues in philosophy of psychiatry. The positions defended assume a naturalistic and realist perspective and are framed against skeptical perspectives on biological psychiatry. Issues addressed include the reality of mental disorders; mechanistic and disease explanations of abnormal behavior; definitions of mental disorder; natural and artificial kinds in psychiatry; biological essentialism and the projectability of psychiatric categories; looping effects and the stability of mental disorders; psychiatric classification; and the validity of the DSM's (...)
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  16. Internalized Norms and Intrinsic Motivations: Are Normative Motivations Psychologically Primitive?Daniel Kelly - 2020 - Emotion Researcher 1 (June):36-45.
    My modest aim in this piece is to frame and illuminate some of the issues surrounding normative motivation, rather than take a firm position on any of them. I begin by clarifying the key terms in my title of this essay, and unpacking some of the assumptions that underpin its question. I then distinguish four kinds of answers one might give. In this short essay I will not be able to properly develop and evaluate an argument for the view that (...)
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  17. Gesetze des Denkens? Von Husserls Und Freges Psychologismus-Kritik Zu Einem Transzendentalen Kern der Logik.David Löwenstein - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (4):514-531.
    Husserl and Frege reject logical psychologism, the view that logical laws are psychological 'laws of thought'. This paper offers an account of these famous objections and argues that their crucial premise, the necessity of logical laws, is justified with reference to a problematic metaphysics. However, this premise can be established in a more plausible way, namely via a transcendental argument which starts from the practice of rational criticism. This argument is developed through a discussion of Quine's holism, which at first (...)
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