Empathy as the Moral Sense?

Philosophia 45 (3):867-879 (2017)
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Abstract
In his recent work, Michael Slote argues that empathy is what Hutcheson called 'the moral sense'. The most innovative argument he offers for this claim is that our empathic reactions play a crucial role in fixing the reference of moral terms. I argue that Slote's bold proposal faces all the main problems of analytical naturalism, as well as some of its own. I suggest that empathy may nevertheless play a more modest and indirect role in acquiring moral knowledge.
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Archival date: 2017-01-19
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.
Two-Dimensional Semantics.Chalmers, David J.
Against Empathy.Prinz, Jesse

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2017-01-19

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