Moral response-dependence, ideal observers, and the motive of duty: Responding to Zangwill

Erkenntnis 60 (3):357-369 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Moral response-dependent metaethical theories characterize moral properties in terms of the reactions of certain classes of individuals. Nick Zangwill has argued that such theories are flawed: they are unable to accommodate the motive of duty. That is, they are unable to provide a suitable reason for anyone to perform morally right actions simply because they are morally right. I argue that Zangwill ignores significant differences between various approvals, and various individuals, and that moral response-dependent theories can accommodate the motive of duty.

Author's Profile

Jason Kawall
Colgate University

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
808 (#14,994)

6 months
71 (#54,318)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?