Willensfreiheit. Antworten auf Walde, Willaschek und Jäger

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The article is a reply to three reviews of my book Willensfreiheit (Berlin/New York 2007) which were published in a previous issue of this journal. In the book, I develop a libertarian account of free will that invokes neither uncaused events nor mind-body dualism nor agent causality. Against Bettina Walde’s criticism, I argue that a well-balanced libertarianism can evade the luck objection and that it should not be portrayed as positing tiny causal gaps in an otherwise deterministic world. Against Marcus Willaschek’s Moorean compatibilism, I argue that our ordinary notion of agency commits us to genuine two-way abilities, i. e. to abilities to do otherwise given the same past and laws of nature. Against Christoph Jäger’s defence of van Inwagen’s consequence argument, I insist that this argument for incompati-bilism is seriously flawed and that libertarians are well-advised not to base their position upon it.
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Archival date: 2019-04-20
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