What has Transparency to do with Husserlian Phenomenology?

ProtoSociology (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts. In Thomasson’s view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or “extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge. I argue that Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct. But the view of consciousness that she pairs with it—a view of consciousness as “transparent” in the sense that first-order, world-oriented experience is in no way given to itself—is not compatible with it and that it is not the point of view Husserl adopts. Rather, Thomasson’s view is, from a Husserlian vantage point, self-undermining in the same way that any genuinely skeptical view is self-undermining. And this is one of the motives Husserl has for holding a non-transparent, same-order view of consciousness alongside his transparent method for self-knowledge acquisition.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KIDWHT
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-01-15
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-01-15

Total views
35 ( #32,587 of 38,962 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #12,455 of 38,962 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.