View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

6 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2019-06-05
    Review of Harald Delius, Self-Awareness: A Semantical Inquiry. [REVIEW]Barry Smith - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46:170--173.
    The thesis of Delius's book is that statements of self-awareness such as "I am aware that I see a cat" possess what he calls 'Cartesian characteristics' of indubitability or absolute self-evidence. He argues that this is the case in virtue of the fact that such statements are not about anything independent of themselves. The book is described as a 'semantical inquiry', but it is not by any means a contribution to the philosophy of language of the predictable sort. Statements of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-02-16
    What has Transparency to Do with Husserlian Phenomenology?Chad Kidd - forthcoming - ProtoSociology.
    This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts. In Thomasson’s view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or “extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge. I argue that Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct. But the view of consciousness that she pairs with it—a view of consciousness as “transparent” in the sense that first-order, world-oriented experience is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2017-03-10
    The Phenomenon of Ego-Splitting in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Pure Phantasy.Marco Cavallaro - 2017 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 48 (2):162-177.
    Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts and to any simple form of act modification. First, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2017-03-08
    Das „Problem“ der Habituskonstitution Und Die Spätlehre des Ich in der Genetischen Phänomenologie E. Husserls.Marco Cavallaro - 2016 - Husserl Studies 32 (3):237-261.
    Der vorliegende Aufsatz behandelt zwei Bereiche, deren Zusammenhang in der aktuellen Husserlforschung zu Unrecht in Vergessenheit geraten zu sein scheint: Zum einen konturiere ich den Habitusbegriff und das damit verbundene Problem der Habituskonstitution im Spätwerk E. Husserls. Zum anderen dient das Ergebnis dieser ersten Untersuchung dann als Grundlage für die Frage nach dem Wesen des Ich in der genetischen Phänomenologie. Die Untersuchung besteht aus drei Teilen: Zuerst stelle ich, um die Bedeutung des Begriffs „Habitus“ zu klären, Ingardens Interpretationsalternativen der Habituskonstitution (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2014-03-11
    The You-I Event: On the Genesis of Self-Awareness.Stephen Langfur - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):769-790.
    I present empirical evidence suggesting that an infant first becomes aware of herself as the focal center of a caregiver's attending. Yet that does not account for her awareness of herself as agent. To address this question, I bring in research on neonatal imitation, as well as studies demonstrating the existence of a neural system in which parts of the same brain areas are activated when observing another's action and when executing a similar one. Applying these findings, I consider gestural (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. added 2013-05-13
    Ist das Erleben Teil des Erlebten?Andrea Borsato - 2009 - Phänomenologische Forschungen (2009):37-59.
    If the inner consciousness of a mental state is a part of the mental state itself, then one is forced to admit an 'inner consciousness of the inner consciousness'. This counterintuitive consequence can however be avoided, if we conceive of the inner consciousness of the mental state as a 'mode of giveness' of the state itself. This paper discusses Brentano's theory of inner consciousness from the point of view of Husserl's philosophy.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations