On the Role of Erotetic Constraints in Non-causal Explanations

Philosophy of Science 91 (5):1078-1088 (2024)
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Abstract

In non-causal explanations, some non-causal facts (such as mathematical, modal or metaphysical) are used to explain some physical facts. However, precisely because these explanations abstract away from causal facts, they face two challenges: 1) it is not clear why would one rather than the other non-causal explanantia be relevant for the explanandum; and 2) why would standing in a particular explanatory relation (e.g., “counterfactual dependence”, “constraint”, “entailment”, “constitution”, “grounding”, and so on), and not in some other, be explanatory. I develop an explanatory relevance account which is based on erotetic constraints and show how it addresses these two challenges.

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Daniel Kostić
University of Groningen

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