Seeing subjectivity: defending a perceptual account of other minds

ProtoSociology (47):239-262 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever achieve knowledge or rational justification in this domain). Until the mid-nineties, the latter debate – which sometimes goes under the name of the “mindreading” debate – was characterized by a fairly clear-cut opposition between two theoretical outlooks: “theory-theory” (TT) and “simulation theory” (ST). Theory-theorists typically argued that we attribute mental states to others on the basis of a “theory of mind” that is either constructed in early infancy and subsequently revised and modified (Gopnik 1996), or else is the result of maturation of innate mindreading “modules” (Baron-Cohen 1995).
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KRUSSD
Upload history
First archival date: 2011-11-24
Latest version: 2 (2016-02-28)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-02-04

Total views
1,634 ( #1,496 of 51,552 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
129 ( #3,395 of 51,552 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.